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RÉSUMÉ 
La commercialisation sous forme de vente aux enchères publique du bois provenant de forêts, 
comme dans la province de Québec, est une tâche difficile. En effet, il est crucial de déterminer 
les prix représentatifs de la vente aux enchères de bois dans toutes les régions du Québec afin de 
permettre à plus d'acheteurs potentiels d'accéder au marché. De même, il est également important 
de concevoir un système d'enchères qui est bénéfique pour les entreprises forestières et les gens 
de Québec. La vente unitaire, dans lequel les utilisateurs de bois autorisés à soumissionner pour le 
lot entier, est actuellement appliquée comme une méthode de vente aux enchères. Dans ce 
système de vente aux enchères du bois, les utilisateurs de bois sont responsables de la récolte de 
la totalité du lot et pour la revente espèces ligneuses indésirables à d'autres utilisateurs. 
Dans ce projet, nous analysons d'abord différentes configurations d’enchères à rondes multiples 
de type premier prix sous pli scellé, tel que proposé par le ministère des Ressources naturelles du 
Québec, afin de mieux comprendre la dynamique et les facteurs dominants de la réussite de ce 
type de mécanisme d'allocation de bois. Pour cela, nous utilisons la simulation à base d'agents 
pour modéliser et simuler des ventes aux enchères, en proposant notamment des comportements 
de soumissionnaires réalistes, incluant des stratégies d'adaptation et d'apprentissage, qui ont été 
simulées et comparées dans diverses configurations. Les comparaisons ont été menées en 
mesurant notamment le taux de succès de gagner l'enchère et le prix unitaire remporté en $/m3. 
Cette étude suggère également des configurations de paramètres permettant maximiser les 
recettes pour le commissaire-priseur. 
À l’étape suivante de la recherche, cette thèse présente la simulation de la vente de plusieurs 
sortes de bois rond en utilisant une méthode d’enchères combinatoires. Dans ce processus de 
vente, les soumissionnaires peuvent avoir besoin d’une combinaison des produits. En utilisant 
l'approche par simulation, les résultats montrent que les revenus générés par enchère 
combinatoire peuvent être plus élevés que le revenu de l’enchère unitaire. Afin d'effectuer une 
analyse de sensibilité, les expériences sont répétées et testés avec diverses combinaisons de 
quatre paramètres de configuration. Les résultats de l'analyse permettent d’évaluer dans quel 
contexte l’enchère combinatoire peut faire mieux que l’enchère unitaire, et cela dans différents 
marchés. 
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Enfin, cette thèse présente un système d'enchères combinatoires qui alloue le bois aux 
soumissionnaires afin d'améliorer la coordination des dépendances entre les soumissionnaires 
retenus dans les zones forestières mixtes (c’est à dire avec plusieurs types de produits et 
utilisateurs potentiels). Pour supporter la coordination des opérations et améliorer la fraicheur du 
bois, nous proposons une vente aux enchères combinatoire, qui permet aux soumissionnaires 
d’ajuster la valeur des offres en fonction du temps, via une sorte de calendriers. Cette enchère 
combinatoire permet ainsi au commissaire-priseur de trouver les meilleures combinaisons de 
soumissions gagnantes maximisant ainsi les préférences temporelles des soumissionnaires. Pour 
cela, nous définissons un nouveau problème de détermination du vainqueur (WDP) qui utilise ces 
fonctions de valeur. Afin de comparer l’impact de diverses préférences temporelles, une analyse 
de sensibilité est menée. 
 
Mots-clés: enchères du bois, enchères séquentielles, la stratégie d'apprentissage, systèmes multi-
agents, l'affectation enchères combinatoire, la coordination, la fraicheur du bois, et de problèmes 
de détermination du vainqueur 
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ABSTRACT 
The marketing of wood obtained from forests in public auction, such as in the province of Québec, 
is a challenging task. Indeed, it is crucial to determine representative prices of the wood auction 
in all regions of Quebec in order to allow more potential buyers to access the market. Similarly, it 
is also important to design an auction system that is beneficial for forest companies and the 
people of Québec. Single-unit auction, in which timber users allowed to bid on the entire lot, is 
currently applied as a method of auction. In this timber auction system, timber users (i.e., 
winners) are responsible for harvesting the entire lot and for reselling unwanted timber species to 
other users.  
In this project, we first analyze various configurations of the multiple-round first-price sealed-bid 
auction of wood as proposed by the Québec Ministry of Natural Resources to better understand 
the dynamics and the dominant factors of success of this type of wood allocation mechanism. To 
do so, we use agent-based simulation to model and simulate auctions with realistic bidders’ 
behavior. Different bidding patterns including adaptive and learning strategies are then simulated 
and compared in various setup configurations. The comparisons have been conducted on the 
success rate of winning the auction and the winning price per m3. This study also suggests 
parameter configurations to maximize revenue for the auctioneer. 
In the next step of research, in the last part, this thesis presents the simulation of multiple-round 
timber combinatorial auction as the bidders may need variety of species and the size of timber 
companies may be different. Using simulation approach, the results shows the revenue generated 
by combinatorial auction can be higher than the revenue of a single unit auction. In order to do 
sensitive analysis of the comparison, the experiments are repeated and tested with different setup 
configuration of four parameters. The results of analysis help to evaluate how combinatorial 
auction can perform better than single auction in different markets. 
Finally, we intend to present an auction system, which allocates wood to bidders in order to 
improve the coordination of the dependencies between winning bidders in mixed forest areas (i.e., 
wood lots with multiple users). To achieve the coordination of procurement operations and 
improve the freshness of the wood, we propose an auction, by allowing the value of bids to be 
expressed as a function of time, via some sort of timetables, and by using a combinatorial auction 
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that will allow the auctioneer to find the best combinations of winning bids. In order to do that, 
we define a new winner determination problem (WDP) that use these value functions for 
coordination procurement and delivery operations and wood freshness. In order to compare the 
proposed time-based combinatorial auction with combinatorial auction a sensitive analysis is 
conducted. The comparison is done according to bidders’ and seller’s time flexibility.  
 
Keywords: timber auction, sequential auction, learning strategy, multi agent system, allocation 
combinatorial auction, coordination, wood freshness, and winner determination problem 
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INTRODUCTION 
Recently, several issues caused decrease in timber sales in Quebec. Environmental issues have 
led to the modification of forest management practices on public land. Forest products markets 
collapse in the United States caused significant reduction in industrial activity. Following this 
reduction, drastic changes in forest management in the province of Quebec, Canada, also led to 
reduction in timber supplies under the Québec forest regime, which was based on an exclusive 
long-term licencing system. Moreover, the licensing system made it difficult to establish a fair 
price for timber transactions. All these changes resulted in the reduction of revenue for the 
government and the reduction of raw materials for local mills. Therefore, the government decided 
to sell part of supplies (25% of available timbers) through auction to determine the representative 
prices of the wood in all regions of Quebec, and to allow access to the timber market to more 
potential buyers. The buyers are interested in having the supplies according to the evaluation of 
their market. Selling wood through auction can help buyers to access supplies according to the 
value of their forest products market.  
It is complicated to design an auction system along with stabilizing a certain level of guaranteed 
supplies. The design should consider different goals such as offering a certain level of stability to 
traditional user, offering opportunities to new entrepreneurs, and assuring a fair financial return 
for a public asset. It is important for the seller to know how to design an auction to maximize the 
benefit in different market conditions.  
The sealed-bid auction is desirable since this type of auction is applicable in all forms of timber 
sales. Although theoretically from an economic point of view, the first-price sealed-bid auction is 
not the most effective auction, it is interesting especially for areas where there would be a low 
level of competition (Cramton, 1998). Indeed, there is no exchange of the information of prices 
that allow players to reassess their bidding values with the flow information. Thus, according to 
Cramton (1998), the first-price bid is preferable in a situation of information asymmetry and low 
level of competition. Using agent-based technology, simulation and design of the multiple-round 
single-unit auction can be investigated. 
The timber auction system could also evolve into a combinatorial auction. A combinatorial 
auction allows the buyer to bid on any lot or combination of lots. This type of auction can 
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significantly improve market efficiency when the value of a combination of lots is greater than 
the sum of individual lots’ value (i.e., additive values).  
If forest stands are mixed (i.e., several lots in one stand), the winners of a combinatorial auction 
must coordinate harvest operations. This can be a challenge for both the seller and the winners. If 
winners cannot reach an agreement regarding the period of harvest, timber freshness can be 
affected. Therefore, for a combinatorial auction to be implemented in the context of the Quebec 
natural forest, harvest operations coordination must be addressed. 
This thesis proposes to study the performance of different configurations of first-price sealed-bid 
auctions and combinatorial auctions in the context of the Quebec natural forest. Both studies aim 
to identify the right auction configuration to use according to different possible auction design 
objectives. Next, an auction mechanism is proposed in order to address directly coordination 
issues during the combinatorial auction. 
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CHAPTER 1 : RESEARCH PROBLEM AND METHODOLOGY  
This Ph.D. thesis is composed of three journal articles. These papers address the problems that 
were described in introduction of the thesis. These papers are as following.  
1) Farnia. F., J.M. Frayret, L. LeBel, C. Beaudry, 2013 “Multiple-Round Timber Auction Design 
and Simulation”, International Journal of production economics, 146(1), 129-141. 
2) Farnia. F., J.M. Frayret, L. LeBel, C. Beaudry, 2014 “Agent-based Simulation of multi-round 
timber combinatorial auction”, submitted to Canadian Journal of Forest Research. 
3) Farnia. F., J.M. Frayret, C. Beaudry, L. LeBel, 2014 “Time-Based Combinatorial Auction for 
Timber Allocation and Delivery Coordination”, Forest Policy and Economics, 50(1), pp 143–152. 
This thesis consists of two main methodologies. The first main methodology is to simulate two 
different timber auctions using agent-base simulation platform (article one and article three). The 
second main methodology is based on developing and designing timber auction model called 
time-base combinatorial auction. 
1.1 Problem description and objective: 
The research problem consists of the design and simulation of timber auctions, which are 
applicable in the studied context, suggests solutions, and explain how the models are working in 
different market situations and auction parameters.  
The objectives of the thesis are defined in order to build a solution for the general problem. The 
objectives are: 
1) Propose a model in order to study the effects of the market situations and auction 
parameters on the outcome of the multiple-round single-unit timber auctions. 
2) Propose advanced bidding patterns to the bidders on how they can get more advantage 
from the auctions.  
3) Propose a model that can compare combinatorial timber auctions with single-unit 
timber auctions and addresses the situations in which one is better than the other.  
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4) Propose a solution to develop an auction that can determine the winners considering 
the coordination among multiple bidders in a given area to deliver high quality woods 
(fresh woods). 
1.2 Research methodology 
This part includes two main methodologies, which are applied to accomplish the problem 
objectives. The first methodology is designing and simulating multiple-round timber auctions 
including parameters analysis using agent-based simulation (first and second papers). The second 
methodology presents an auction method (time-base combinatorial auction), which overcomes the 
problems within current timber auctions (third paper).  
1.2.1 Methodology of timber auction design and simulation (Paper 1 & 2) 
The first methodology of the thesis includes design and simulation of multiple round timber 
auctions. The simulations are based on multi agent systems. The model consists of the seller, the 
buyers, and the auctioneer. In this methodology, the auctioneer announces several auctions 
periodically to the market. When the auctions are announced, bidders must decide whether or not 
they participate in auction and how much they want to bid.  
The auction system includes several decision variables and parameters. There is a set of items 
with random parameters. The simulation model also contains three different types of agents 
according to their needs. The bidders contain several parameters including bidding pattern. After 
announcing items and collecting bids, the auctioneer chooses the winner(s). In order to allow the 
model to be dynamic, the bidder agents update their needs and their mill’s capacity.   
The simulation model includes several parameters such as the number of bidders, the average lot 
size, the auction periodicity, and the number of auction per year to study the impacts of different 
auction configuration.  
1.2.2 Multiple round single-unit auctions 
This methodology is used in paper 1, which is described in Chapter 3. The auctions that are 
announced in the multiple round auctions are first-price single-unit auctions. The items that the 
seller wants to sell are lots, which consists of four different types of products. In this model, after 
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receiving bids, the auctioneer chooses the winner that has offered the highest price for each 
individual item.  
This model allows the bidders to decide which item(s) they want to send their bids according to 
their need and the characteristics of the lot. In this model, the bidders also can decide their bid 
amount using their bidding pattern. To find the optimum bidding pattern, five bidding patterns are 
proposed: random bidding, fixed behaviour, adaptive, learning, and adaptive learning approaches.  
To achieve the objectives of the first two contributions, three experiments have been conducted. 
In the first two experiments, different bidding patterns are compared in four different simulated 
scenarios. Each scenario is a combination of a number of potential bidders and an average lot size. 
These scenarios simulate the competitiveness of the market and the average wood supply amount 
in the market. In the first experiment, the four scenarios are compared where there are an equal 
number of bidder agents using each type of bidding patterns. In the second experiment, we 
compared the same four scenarios with five configurations of hybrid bidder agents of adaptive 
learning approach. Finally, in the third experiment, we used a factorial design plan as the 
combinations of three levels of each auction parameter in order to investigate the effects of 
auction configurations. 
1.2.3 Multiple-round combinatorial auctions 
In this methodology, combinatorial auctions are used at each round of auction. The advantage of 
using combinatorial auction is that it allows the bidders to bid on any combination of the four 
products of a lot. Therefore at each round, the bidder can bid on both the entire lot, or any subset 
of the lot. In this simulation model, the auctions that are announced are combinatorial auctions. 
For each auction the bidders bid on any combination according to their need using adaptive 
learning approach. 
Several experiments have been conducted in order to achieve the objective of this thesis. First, the 
revenue of combinatorial auction is compared to the revenue of single-unit auction at each round 
of the auction, in order to evaluate the effect of combinatorial auction on revenue. Other 
experiments are repeated and tested with different setup configurations of four parameters, i.e., 
various numbers of auctions per year, periodicity, lot size, and number of bidders. The analysis of 
variance of the parameters on the timber price is also presented. To verify the results, the 
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comparison of combinatorial auction and single unit auction is tested with different setup 
configurations. The comparison helps to evaluate whether combinatorial auction can outperform 
single-unit auction in certain conditions. Similar studies have been conducted to investigate the 
target achievement of bidders in combinatorial auction and comparison of both single and 
combinatorial auctions. 
1.3 Methodology of time-base combinatorial auction (Paper 3) 
This methodology includes the development of an auction, which considers coordination of 
harvest operations. In this methodology, first the concept of time-based combinatorial auction is 
presented. In this auction model, the bidders can also present their preferred combinations of 
goods at their time preferences. The winner determination problem (WDP) of time-base 
combinatorial auction is proposed. In this model, the seller can decide how flexible he can be on 
the duration of harvesting operation.  
Several experiments have been conducted in this methodology. First, a sensitive analysis is 
performed in order to compare the proposed time-based combinatorial auction with a 
combinatorial auction. To investigate the effect of this model on the outcome of the auction, both 
models are compared according to bidders’ and seller’s time flexibility. The difference between 
the revenue of both combinatorial auction and time-based combinatorial auction associates with 
cost of coordination. This cost can be used as an upper bound of the cost of coordination. 
1.4 Structure of thesis 
This thesis proceeds as follows. The critical review of timber auction design and simulation is 
explained in Chapter 2. Article 1 is “Multiple-Round Timber Auction Design and Simulation”, 
which is presented in Chapter 3. Next, Chapter 4 includes the article 2 describing “Agent-based 
Simulation of Multi-round Timber Combinatorial Auction”. “Time-Based Combinatorial Auction 
for Timber Allocation and Delivery Coordination” which is the article 3 is also presented in 
Chapter 5. Finally, general discussion of the thesis is presented in Chapter 6, followed by a 
conclusion and future works (Chapter 7). 
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CHAPTER 2 : CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
2.1 Introduction 
The literature of the design and simulation of timer auctions consists of several main research 
areas. The first area of research includes the auction design in scarce natural resources. The other 
areas consist of auction design issues in general auction design such as multiple-round auctions, 
multi-agent simulation, bidding strategies, and combinatorial auction. Studying these areas led to 
the development of a state-of-the-art auction system for natural resources. 
Some documentation is available on the allocation mechanisms in the timber sale system. In 
British Columbia, experts have determined that 20% sale on the open market of wood and 80% of 
wood sale under license would be sufficient to ensure a fair allocation. The statistical value of 
sales obtained by the British Colombia Timber Sale will be considered robust when nearly 20% 
of the public forest timber will be sold at auction (Athey et al. 2002). The study by British 
Colombia Timber Sale system shows that at least 40% of timber sales on the open market is used 
to allow a fair allocation (Crowe, 2008). Other research works suggest similar market allocations, 
which are discussed in more details in the upcoming chapters. 
2.1.1 Forms of auctions 
There are several types of auctions to consider for the sale of timber in Quebec: the English 
auction (the price goes up to the highest bid), the Dutch auction (the price goes down to the last 
time), the first price sealed bid auction, the Vickrey auction (the highest bid wins, but the winner 
pays the second price), simultaneous multiple auctions (all items offered at the same time), and 
combinatorial auction (a bid can be placed on an item or combination of items).  
In this thesis, all the auctions that are applied in timber market are sealed-bid auctions. In this 
auction, the bidders cannot adjust their bids to others bids, since the information are not public. 
According to Milgrom (1989), the sealed-bid auctions are more suitable for governmental 
contracts and allocating natural resources. 
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2.2 State of the art of timer auction design and simulation 
In this section we are introducing several aspects of the design and simulation of the auction. To 
better understand the literature review, we listed several topics, which are related to our research 
problem. 
2.2.1 Auction design in natural resources  
Oil, mineral, radio spectrum, and timber rights are limited natural resources where allocating and 
pricing the resources are important areas of research. The allocation of natural resources can be 
done through formal and informal processes. Auctions are formal process while generating 
research interest in economic, marketing and consumer behaviour fields. There are several 
reasons why auction is appropriate for allocating natural resources to companies (Cramton, 2007). 
Because auction is a competitive and transparent method for allocating natural resource while 
maximizes the revenue.  
According to analyses of Cramton (2007), a selection of auction models are applicable for 
auctioning oil rights. The level of competition and structure of bidder preferences are two main 
factors of auction design. When the bidders have additive values and competition is low, first-
price sealed-bid auction can be more appropriate. If bidders have almost additive values and 
competition is higher, then an open auction is applicable. These approaches can result in best-
selling price and can decrease bidder uncertainty.  
The main disadvantage of open auctions is that it is more vulnerable to tacit collusion; bidders 
can send signals during open auction. For example, companies can arrange not to compete against 
each other and consider punishment when they don’t observe the agreement at the time of auction. 
However, in sealed bid auction signaling and punishment cannot be performed. Therefore, sealed-
bid auction is preferable when collusion is an issue (Cramton and Schwartz, 2000). 
Several auction models have been investigated to solve the timber allocation problem, 
considering different aspects of timber auction: (Mead (1967), Hansen (1985), Paarsch (1991), 
Elyakime et al. (1994, 1997), Baldwin et al. (1997), Athey and Levin (2001), Haile (2001), Athey 
et al. (2011). Auction is a competitive method of allocation while it maximizes the revenue for 
the seller. Auction design is crucial since it can make an efficient assignment of rights to bidders, 
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and also maximizes revenue for the government (Cramton, 2007). Athey and Levin (2001) 
described that bids in timber auctions are multidimensional.  
Athey Levin, and Seira (2004), studied bidding patterns in sealed bid and open timber auctions 
with various kinds of bidders. They observed US forest service timber to find out the comparative 
outcome of open and sealed bid auctions. Their key finding is that sealed bid auctions are better 
for timber market by virtue of attracting more small bidders, allocating more products to these 
bidders, and in some cases making higher revenue. 
The structure of oil rights auction and spectrum auctions are comparable in type of auction design. 
The important differences of timber auction with these two auctions are the product of the auction 
and the structure of auction design is from dynamic and static aspects. In oil rights auction and 
spectrum right auction, the oral or open auction is more appropriate because of the degree of 
competition among bidders. In contrast, in timber auction the sealed bid or closed auctions are 
attractive (Athey Levin, and Seira, 2004). A disadvantage of open bidding is that the bidding 
process discloses information of others valuations (Milgrom and Weber, 1982). Furthermore, in 
oil rights auction and spectrum right auction the bidders are more interested in the entire oil right 
than in entire a timber right. In fact, in timber licenses, the bidders are not interested in all species 
in a specific area.  
One of the common characteristics in all three auctions is that they encourage simultaneous 
auctions rather than sequential auction. A disadvantage of sequential auctions is that the auctions 
limit the information available to bidders and limit how the bidders can respond to information. 
In sequential auctions, the bidding pattern is complicated since bidders must predict what prices 
will be in upcoming auctions when defining bids in the current auction. However, sequential 
auction can be better in a case where there are many auctions.  
Cramton (2009) declared that the concerns of the auction design are almost similar in all scarce 
natural resources. Generally, when the competition of the market is weak and the bidders have 
additive values, a simultaneous first-price sealed-bid auction can be the best allocation method.  
Timber market includes a low degree of competition. The first reason is that the forest companies 
may not be interested in all species in the lot. Second, the cost of transportation from the lot to the 
bidder’s mill affects the number of participating bidders. Consequently, the timber auction is 
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significantly different from the other applications of natural resource auctions, because of the 
complexity of the problem (distance and species composition). 
2.2.2 Auction design aspects 
Before considering design issues, it is important to think first about the bidders’ preferences. 
There are three standard bidding valuation methods: private values, common values, and 
interdependent values. In private values, each bidder’s value does not rely on the private market’s 
information of the other bidders. Common values are situations where items have the same value 
to all bidders. Interdependent values are valuation functions in which each bidder’s value of a 
product depends on his and other bidders’ private information (Cramton 2009).      
Auction design consists of several steps. The first step is to identify the objectives of the auction, 
what is the maximize revenue. The government wants to gain the maximum revenue over the 
long duration from its resources.  
Other than the objective, it is essential that the auctioneer introduce a familiar method of 
explanation of bids to winners. The bids can be one-dimensional, or multi-dimensional bids. The 
next step is defining the product —what items should be sold in the auction. These products 
might be different in every kind of auction. The lot size, volume, and location are some example 
for product definition.  
In the next step a number of basic design issues should be considered:  
• Sequential vs. simultaneous sale with set of lots sold one after another or all at once  
• Dynamic vs. static auctions by an ascending auction process or a single sealed bid 
• The information for the bidders to know when they should send their bids 
• Reserve prices or the minimum selling prices 
One of the main issues of auctioning set of items is how to introduce the items in the market. 
Multiple-round auctions include set of auctions, which announce multiple goods consequently or 
concurrently (Grossklags et al., 2000). Bidder’s behaviour can be analysed and predicated at the 
time of auction design to get more advantage of the multiple-round auction. The reason is that the 
behaviour of a bidder in an auction can change when there are other auctions in the market. Kagel 
(1995) studied and analyzed the bidding behavior of multiple-round auctions. More specially, 
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Bidding in multiple-round online auction is investigated in many studies (Anthony and Jennings 
2002, Shehory 2002, Airiau and Sen 2003, Greenwald and Boyan 2005, Gerding 2008, Yue et al. 
2010).  
Weber (1983) and Menezes (1993) compared the advantages and disadvantages of sequential 
auction and simultaneous auction. Zeithammer (2004) studied the bidders’ behaviour, which 
considers forward auctions in sequential auctions. In forward-thinking behaviour, bidders bid 
lower if there are other auctions to be announced by the seller in upcoming auction. Ashenfelter 
(1989) also investigated that the selling price of each item drops consequently in auctioning 
multiple items. Ganuza (2004) concluded that in a round of an auction, the auctioneer should 
publish less information to the bidders in order to have more competition.  Pinker et al. (2000) 
and Karuga et al. (2005) studied “the number of auctions” to be introduced at each round of an 
online sequential auction. Besides, Lange et al. (2011) considered the bidding behavior changing 
in multiple-round auction with resale option.  
Bidding strategies is one of the main aspects that have been considered in different kind of 
auctions. Bidding strategy is a guideline to manage bidding in order to achieve the goal of the 
bidder. Zero-Intelligence-Plus (ZIP) strategy (i.e, agents adjust their offer prices with the market 
activity) is one of the simplest strategies (Gode and Sunder 1993, Cliff and Bruten 1997). ZIP 
Bidding strategies using history of past auctions (learning strategies) is studied by Boutilier et al. 
(1999) and Tesauro and Bredlin (2001). Various strategies can be used by bidders using 
mathematical functions to find the optimal bidding value. It is crucial to find the best strategy 
according to the situations of the auction.  
Timber combinatorial auction is a way of allocating timber products to buyers. The timber 
products can be species or part of a lot and bidders can bid on any combination of these products 
(Cramton et al., 2006). The winning bid is the combination with the highest combined value of 
the bids. In resource allocation problem, when the resources are different, combinatorial auction 
is a practical technique (i.e. Rassenti et al., 1982; Ghassemi Tari and Alaei, 2013; Wang and 
Dargahi, 2013). In scheduling problems also combinatorial auction is proper method (i.e. Brewer, 
1999; De Vries and Vohra, 2003; Cramton et al., 2006; Jung and Kim 2006). 
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2.2.3 Multi-agent simulation and auction design 
Multi agent system is a computerized system that consists of intelligent agents which are 
interacting in an environment. The intelligent agents can sense and react in interaction with other 
agents without the direct interference of a user. The software agents also are able to manage their 
actions and goal-directed behaviours (Wooldridge and Jennings, 1994). 
Recently, multi-agent simulation has been used to simulate and study auction systems (Vidal, 
2007). Multi-agent simulation is an effective method to simulate and analyze auction systems 
while studying the complex interactions among different kinds of agents. Researches have 
analyzed the interaction among different agents with large-scale data. Specially, when the 
simulated auction is complex and there are many agents involves, multi-agent simulation handles 
the bidders’ interactions and bidding strategies. Using multi-agent simulation, mathematical 
analyses do not need to be simplified and economic methods such as Bayesian Nash equilibrium 
are not assumed (Mehlenbacher, 2007). These advantages lead us to use multi-agent system for 
simulation and study multiple-round timber auctions.   
Autonomous agents are used to analyze different bidding strategies in different applications. 
Artificial adaptive agents are used to implement some experiments in learning in auctions 
(Andreoni and Miller, 1995). Bapna et al. (2003) simulated auctions using multi-agents in order 
to maximize the profit for both seller and buyer. To combine three different bidding strategies, 
they suggested hybrid bidding strategies. 
Combinatorial auction includes large-scale data, which can be easily done in Multi-agent 
simulation. Multi-agent simulation platform can handle both bidder’s behavior and winner 
determinations (Vidal, 2007). The randomness of the parameters of the simulated auction model 
is a challenge in designing and simulating auction system (Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2009). 
Combinatorial auction is investigated and simulated in several research works including 
Kutanglui and Wu (2001), where an autonomous distributed scheduling model is applied. 
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2.3 Research opportunities 
Considering the need of government about implementing a proper auction system and analyzing 
the critical literature review guided us to several research ideas about simulating and designing 
timber auctions. 
First, considering the literature review, it is an opportunity to simulate and analyze both 
sequential and simultaneous auctions simultaneously. Although the literature sometimes 
encourages simultaneous auctions due to complicated bidding pattern, this study considers both 
sequential and simultaneous since there are lots of auctions that should be announced. This study 
also proposes advanced bidding patterns to guide bidders how to bid in sequential auction to gain 
more profit.  
Then, the bidders’ behavior and bidding strategies in multiple-round timber auctions have not 
been studied in the literature. Although the methods of adaptive learning are hard to investigate in 
auctions, it does not take into account the time pressure and many other factors that should be 
considered in the context of timber auctions. For example, the bidders should consider the 
pressure of time in multiple-round of auctions since as time passes without wining on auction, the 
profit of running mills decreases due to fixed costs. Therefore, the bidders should change their 
bidding strategies as time passes. 
Next, in timber auction the bidders may be interested in a part of a lot, which is different from 
other natural resources. Hence, when they win all species, they re-sell some species after they 
totally harvest the entire area. This may cause some problems in wood quality, such as wood 
deteriorating. Also, the winner would delay harvesting the area if it does not find a good buyer for 
some species in the area. Therefore, it seems that it is better to also study combinatorial auction, 
as the simulation of this kind of the auction has not been investigated yet. 
Finally, synchronizing the forest operation planning among the winners in the same area is 
important for winner determination, as it cannot be described in combinatorial auction. The Lack 
of this kind of auction guided us to present time-base combinatorial auction. All of these 
parameters together make this kind of auction more complicated than the other auction 
applications in natural resource. 
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2.4 Contributions of the research thesis 
This research thesis proposes three different contributions, which are presented in three papers. 
The first paper proposes the design and the simulation of multiple-round single-unit timber 
auction. Using agent-based simulation, simultaneous sequential timber auctions are simulated. A 
mathematical linear programing model is developed to determine the best set of items to bid at 
each round of the auction. This paper suggests different bidding patterns including adaptive and 
agent-learning methods. This study presents parameter configurations of the model to maximize 
revenue for the auctioneer. This paper has been accepted in June 2013 for publication in the 
International Journal of Production Economics (submitted in January 2013)  
The second paper proposes the design and the simulation of multiple-round timber combinatorial 
auction. The paper shows that the combinatorial auction can generate more revenue for the 
government comparing single unit auction in many different market situations. The markets 
conditions in which combinatorial auction can outperform single-unit auction are presented. This 
paper has been submitted to Canadian Journal of Forest Research.  
The third paper proposes an auction system, referred to as time-based timber combinatorial 
auction. The contribution of this auction model is including time, which is used to valuate the 
good for sale with respect to expected delivery period in combinatorial auction. This system 
allocates multiple goods in mixed forest stand, to multiple winners, and to address the 
coordination of timber deliveries to winners while considering the freshness of wood. Moreover, 
the winner determination problem of time-base combinatorial auction is presented for the 
auctioneers who want to use this auction in their model. Finally, the model contributes on 
delivery coordination while it may impact total revenue due to loss of value when time preference 
is not fully satisfied. This paper has been submitted in December 2013 and accepted in July 2014 
for publication in Forest Policy and Economics. 
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CHAPTER 3 : ARTICLE 1 : MULTIPLE-ROUND TIMBER AUCTION 
DESIGN AND SIMULATION 
Abstract: 
This paper presents a multiple-round timber auction simulation, developed in order to study 
various configurations of auction design. In this study, simultaneous sequential timber auctions 
are modelled and analyzed using agent-based simulation. As there are many individual items in 
the auction to be sold, the auction designer defines several rounds that are sequential at pre-
defined intervals. At each round, the auction designer announces several simultaneous auctions. 
Since bidders are offered different items at each round, a mathematical linear programming 
model for selecting the best set of items to bid for is presented. Different bidding patterns are 
simulated and compared in various setup configurations. The most advanced of these strategies 
are adaptive and use agent-learning capability. The comparisons include the success rate of 
winning the auction and the winning price per m3. This study suggests an efficient bidding pattern 
for bidders to bid in order to achieve to their goal and increase their profit. Similarly, in order to 
increase profit, the auctioneer (i.e., the government) needs to control several auction parameters 
including the number of auctions per year, the lot size, the auction periodicity, and the number of 
bidders. This study also suggests parameters configurations that to maximize revenue for the 
auctioneer. 
Keywords: timber auction, sequential auction, learning strategy, multi agent system, and 
allocation. 
3.1 Introduction 
Environmental pressure to reform forest management practices on public land, as well as drastic 
reduction in industrial activity following forest products markets collapse in the United States, 
have led to a net decrease in timber sales. At the same time, successful mills or entrepreneurs 
complained that access to wood supply was impossible under the Québec forest regime, which 
was based on an exclusive long-term licensing system. Moreover, this licensing system made it 
difficult to establish a fair price for transactions. In response to these issues, the Québec 
government decided to make a portion of the annual wood supply (25%) available through an 
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auction system, as soon as 2013. With wood available through auction, buyers can access 
supplies according to the value of their own forest products market. In such a context it is 
complex to design an auction system while preserving a certain level of guaranteed supplies.  
Different goals are pursued such as offering a certain level of stability to traditional user, offering 
opportunities to new entrepreneurs and assuring a fair financial return for a public asset.  
In this paper the sealed first-price Auction protocol is considered as the interaction protocol 
between the auctioneer agent (i.e., a government agency) and the bidder agents (i.e., forest 
products companies). In this type of auction, bidders submit their sealed bids, all at the same time, 
without disclosure of the bid content to competitors. After evaluation, the bidder with the highest 
bid is announced to pay the proposed price and own the lot. This method of auction is different 
from the English auction method, in which each bidder can only bid once at each time. Further, 
bidders cannot adjust their proposed bid, since they do not have information about their 
competitors’ bid. It is therefore more appropriate in this context to use sealed technique in 
tendering, such as in mining leases and governmental contracts (Milgrom, 1989). 
Timber auctions aim at selling timber lots via a bidding process. The multiple-round timber 
auction is a process, in which the auctioneer announces several different items (i.e., wood lots) 
periodically to the bidders. The design of a simulation platform of a wood procurement system 
based on a multiple-round auction requires a framework that captures the basic dynamics of that 
system. Therefore, agent-based simulation is used in this study to design and simulate realistic 
agents’ behaviours and bidding patterns in the context of a multiple-round timber auction. 
In this paper, different combinations of bidding patterns and auction design parameters are 
simulated and compared in order to better understand the impacts of various factors of the 
auctions outcomes. The results show the combined influence of several auction design parameters 
and bidding patterns over both bidders' capacity to achieve procurement target and the seller's 
total profit.  
The remaining of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review. The 
simulation multiple-round auction model is presented in Section 3, followed by the models of the 
agents' bidding patterns in Section 4. Section 5 presents the results of experiments designed to 
compare and validate the various bidding patterns. Next, Section 6 presents and discusses the 
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results of experiments designed to specifically study the influence of various auction 
configurations. Finally, Section 7 concludes and presents the limitations of this research. 
3.2 Theoretical background 
Allocating and pricing limited natural resources, such as oil, mineral rights, spectrum, and timber, 
are two important questions. In order to solve timber allocation problems, many auction models 
have been used (Mead (1967), Hansen (1985), Paarsch (1991), Elyakime et al. (1994, 1997), 
Baldwin et al. (1997), Athey and Levin (2001), Haile (2001), Athey et al. (2011)). In practice, 
formal and informal processes are used to determine the allocation of natural resources. Auctions 
are an example of formal process for allocating and pricing natural resources. They have 
generated research interest in economic, marketing and consumer behaviour fields. Auction 
maximizes the revenue for the seller, while being transparent and competitive method of 
allocation. An efficient auction design can achieve both an efficient assignment of rights to 
bidders, and maximizes revenue for the seller (Cramton, 2007).  
The auction process contains three main elements: auction issues, auction protocols, and auction 
strategies. The bidders apply the auction protocols to express clear rules and procedures. These 
rules are used to send bids, accept or reject proposals, as well as decide when the auction starts 
and ends. The bidders’ preference and the need of the bidder at the time of auction are part of the 
auction strategies (McAfee and McMillan, 1987). 
Multiple-round auctions usually consist of a number of auctions that are announced consecutively 
or concurrently, dealing with multiple goods (Grossklags et al., 2000). One of the important 
aspects of analysing this type of auction is to attempt to analyze and predict bidders’ behaviour. 
To achieve this goal, different theoretical and empirical studies have been developed (Kagel, 
1995). Many of the studies on bidding in multiple-round auctions involve online auction 
(Anthony and Jennings 2002, Shehory 2002, Airiau and Sen 2003, Greenwald and Boyan 2005, 
Gerding 2008, Yue et al. 2010). 
Similarly, several studies have compared the advantages and disadvantages of sequential auction 
over simultaneous auction (Weber, 1983, Menezes, 1993). In sequential auctions, Zeithammer 
(2004) investigated the bidders’ forward-looking behaviour. In forward-looking behaviour, 
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bidders intend to underbid if they expect another auction by the seller to happen in the next round 
of the auction. Along the same line, Ashenfelter (1989) concludes that in selling multiple items 
through the auction, the selling price of the each item drops accordingly. Ganuza (2004) studies 
the sale item information to be revealed by auctioneer in a round of the auction. This study shows 
that to have more competition, the auctioneer should publish less information to the bidders. By 
using data from Internet auction sites, Pinker et al. (2000), and Karuga et al. (2005) study the 
number of items to be sold in each round of a sequential auction. However, in these studies, they 
did not consider both sequential and simultaneous auction. Furthermore, auction with resale is 
one of the aspects that can be considered in multiple round auctions. Lange et al. (2011) 
investigate changing in the biding behavior in timber auction with resale compare to the auction 
without resale option. 
Similarly, bidding strategies have been studied in various kinds of auction systems. One such 
strategy is Zero-Intelligence-Plus (ZIP) strategy (Gode and Sunder 1993, Cliff and Bruten 1997). 
However the advantage of ZIP strategy is unknown over other strategies. In sequential and 
simultaneous auctions, Boutilier et al. (1999) and Tesauro and Bredlin (2001) investigated 
bidding strategies that use history (past auctions). Mathematical functions are widely used by 
different strategies to calculate optimal bid(s) value, or to calculate the amount of bid at every 
time step for the bidder. 
The application of multi-agent technology to simulate and study auction systems is generating 
increasing interest (Vidal, 2007). Indeed, such a simulation allows researchers to study the 
interactions among agents and process large amounts of data. Furthermore, multi-agent 
simulation enables the modeling of bidders’ interactions and bidding strategies in complex 
environments. Mehlenbacher (2007) explain that multi-agent simulation has some advantages, as 
it does not require simplifying assumptions of mathematical analysis, nor assumptions about 
Bayesian Nash equilibrium used by econometric methods.  
However, although bidding processes have been used in the field of distributed artificial 
intelligence, such as in the Contract-Net, the design of a simulation system of auctions requires to 
address and overcome challenges. One of these challenges is the randomness of bidders' 
preferences (Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2009 and Vidal, 2007).  
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In order to analyze different bidding strategies in different applications, several studies use 
autonomous agents. A software agent is a situated autonomous computer system capable of 
sensing and reacting to change in its environment without the direct intervention of a user. As a 
consequence, a software agent has a certain level of control over its actions. A software agent can 
also exhibit goal-directed behaviour by interacting with other agents or humans (Wooldridge and 
Jennings, 1994). These agents are autonomous and intelligent software entities that are designed 
to conduct different task with minimum human supervision. Andreoni and Miller (1995) 
implemented experiments with artificial adaptive agents systems and investigate learning in 
auctions. To study the interaction of agents they used genetic algorithm to implement adaptive 
learning algorithm. However, their method is not compatible with the context of time pressure, as 
many factors should be considered. They explained that adaptive learning is very hard to 
investigate in auction. Bapna et al. (2003) applied different types of agents to simulate auctions, 
aiming to maximize both seller and buyer profit. They introduced agents with virtual behavior 
that can play with real human bidders. They also proposed hybrid bidding strategies, which 
consist three different bidding strategies. 
In an auction, bidders need to consider the other participants when they offer their bids. In 
contrast, a seller (i.e., the auctioneer) should consider the protocol of the auction, potential buyers, 
and other competing sellers in order to sell items with highest profit (Park et al. 1999). Agents 
use different models to find their best moves (i.e. equilibrium strategies); one model in game 
theory is to use a prediction of other bidder’s possible moves and payoffs (Kreps, 1990). Other 
researchers have reported the design of an agent with the ability of predicting opponents, move in 
the bid, as well as opponents’ idea about other participants (Gmytrasiewicz and Durfee, 1995; 
Vidal and Durfee, 1996). However, when the model is complex and dynamic with a large number 
of bidders, the behaviour modeling of other agents is impossible. Even if some models exist, 
using them is difficult and implementation is complex (Park et al. 1999).  
Cramton (2007) studied the design of auctions and highlighted the reason why auction is 
appropriate for the allocation of natural resources to individual companies. For instance, the 
author claimed that the structure of bidder’s preferences and the competition level are two 
examples of settings that determine the best auction format. Simultaneous sealed first-price 
auction is one of the best options for a weak competition and for bidders with additive values. It 
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is indeed easy to implement. It requires no price discovery. It controls weak competition and 
bidder collusion (Milgrom 1987). Sealed-bid auction is less disposed to collusion, while in open 
bidding, bidders use predetermined agreements through their bids. Similarly, sealed-bid auction 
returns higher revenues when bidders have different preferences (Maskin and Riley 2000; 
Klemperer 2002).  
Athey et al. (2011) used some data of timber sales for auction design to compare the results of 
open and sealed-bid timber auctions. As an observed outcome, small bidders are attracted more to 
sealed-bid timber auctions, which generate greater revenue for the U.S. in some forests. 
In collaboration with the partner of this project, the Bureau de mise en marché des bois of the 
Québec government, a simulation platform was developed and implemented in order to study 
various configurations of multiple-round sealed-bid timber auctions. This type of auctions 
consists of a number of auctions announced at predefined time periods and concurrently (i.e., a 
each time period, a set of timber lots are announced simultaneously). It was selected by the 
Bureau de mise en marché des bois as the Québec timber auction system. The aim of this paper is 
to present a multi-agent auction simulation model and the results of various experiments, and to 
analyse these results in order to better understand the impacts of these configurations.  
3.3 Multiple-Round Timber Auction Model 
The proposed model contains three main components: the seller (i.e., government), the buyers 
(i.e., mills, entrepreneurs), and the auctioneer (i.e., a governmental agency). The auctioneer 
manages the publication and general organisation of the auction. The seller wants to sell several 
items (i.e., timber lots). The auctioneer announces the items periodically in several rounds of 
auctions. In other words, at each round, there are many items to be sold. At the start of each round, 
which is decided by the auctioneer, the items for sale in this period are announced. These items 
have specific characteristics such as their location, their timber volume, and their species and 
quality, which make them different from each other. Once the auctions are initiated, bidders must 
decide whether or not they wish to bid on these items, and how much. Because bidders can be 
located anywhere, transform different types of timber, and supply different forest products 
markets, they have different valuation and interest on each of the items.  
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The design of such an auction system includes several decision variables and parameters. First, 
there is a set of items (I) that the auctioneer announces to the bidders. Each item i is unique, with 
a specific set of features. In other words, the potential value of each item is different from the 
others. In the simulation, these features are randomly assigned to each item. More specifically, it 
is assumed that each item consists of two species including hardwood and softwood, two 
different levels of quality for each species, a predefined volume, a ground slope, and a geographic 
location. In other words, each item to be sold is represented by a volume of hardwood of quality 1, 
a volume of hardwood of quality 2, a volume of softwood of quality 1, a volume of softwood of 
quality 2, a location, and a reserve price. Before the auction, the seller can measure the reserve 
price. It is the lowest price the seller is willing to receive form each lot. However, to calculate this 
price, many factors should be considered to have an optimal reserve price. Paarsch (1997) 
describes how the optimal reserve price in timber auctions can be measured from some criteria 
such as volume of timber by species, upset rate of each species, location, year, and month of the 
auction. In this simulation, because there is limited information, the reserve price is set according 
to the location, the volume of hardwood of quality 1, the volume of hardwood of quality 2, the 
volume of softwood of quality 1, the volume of softwood of quality 2, and the upset rate of each 
species with different qualities. 
Next, the simulation model contains different types of agents. Bidder agents, also called bidders 
(j), participate in the auction and bid for items. Here, three kinds of bidding agents are defined 
according to their needs for specific types of products. These three types include the paper mill, 
the lumber mill, and the entrepreneur. Paper mills mostly require softwood; lumber mills mainly 
need hardwood; and, entrepreneurs are interested in both softwood and hardwood. The 
parameters of each bidder include the type of bidder as well as its transformation capacity per 
year (i.e., both paper mills and lumber mills), their supply need per year, their location, their 
bidding pattern, and their forest products market price. Similarly, in order to study the impacts of 
various auction configurations, the proposed simulation model includes also several parameters 
such as the number of bidders, the average lot size, the auction periodicity, and the number of 
auction per year.  
At the start of the auction, the auctioneer calls all of the potential bidders. These bidders may not 
be interested in all items. Therefore, at each round, several individual items are generated and 
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announced to the bidders. For each individual item auction, each bidder i has an entry cost ki of 
gathering information and entering the auction and a private value for the item vi depending on 
their valuation of the item. Other factors include distance, supply need, transformation capacity, 
and the market price that mills can obtain for their products. Concerning entrepreneurs, their 
capacity is defined as the forecast of their buyers' aggregated demand. Similarly, their need is 
defined as their capacity minus the volume of their past wins.  
After announcing items and receiving bids, the auctioneer chooses the winner that has offered the 
highest price for each item. Some bidders may win one or more items, while others may obtain 
none. If the item is not assigned at a specific round, it remains in the set of items to be sold and is 
announced again during the next round of the auctions until it is sold. The developed model 
allows bidder agents to update their needs in order to reflect changes in their environment.  
3.4 Agents’ model 
The design of such a simulation platform requires the modelling of the behaviour and interactions 
of two types of agents, namely the auctioneer and the bidders. In sequential simultaneous timber 
auctions, bidders face two non-trivial decisions: (1) Which sub-set of items (i.e., timber lots) is 
more profitable for them to bid on; and (2) How much should they bid for each item. The first 
question depends on the characteristics of the lot and on the supply needs of the mill. The second 
depends on their valuation of each lot, as well as on the bidder’s bidding pattern. The design of 
our simulation platform proposes several elements to address these questions. The next section 
explains the auctioneer's and bidders' decision problems and the processes design to solve and 
simulate them. 
3.4.1 Auctioneer 
In a sequential auction, at the start of each round, the auctioneer announces the auction. Once the 
auction is closed after a specific time period, the auctioneer identifies the winners. The design of 
a simulated auction system requires the auctioneer to consider the potential issues regarding the 
auction process and the behaviour of the bidders. One of the key issues in sequential auction is 
collusion. For a single unit auction, Graham and Marshall (1987) and Mailath and Zemsky (1991) 
address the collusion problem caused by a group of bidders who cooperatively agree to bid in an 
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auction. Such cooperation usually occurs via meetings outside the auction. By colluding, bidders 
collaborate to decrease the level of competition to pay less for the auctioned items.  
In order to avoid collusion, the Bureau de mise en marché des bois proposes in its auction design 
that an auction is cancelled if it receives 2 bids or less. In this context, the items for sale are 
simply offered again during the next rounds of auctions. In many cases, such a constraint prevents 
collusion because the probability of collusion is lower when a bidder wants to have an item at a 
specific time and the bidder knows there is a chance of cancelling the auction. Therefore, the 
bidders prefer participating in the action without collusion and winning the auction rather than 
collaborating with others and losing their winning chance. Similarly, mills belonging to the same 
corporate group or company are not allowed to bid separately. Another technique to avoid 
collusion is simply to increase the number of bidders. Because the auctioneer has a limited 
control over the number of bidders (there is indeed a limited number of forest products companies 
in the region), bids are allowed from outside of the region.  
After selecting items to be auctioned, and for a given number of bidders, the auctioneer identifies 
the first highest price for each item, as long as the price is higher than the reserve price. 
Subsequently, the auctioneer announces the winner and the price paid by the winner. Hence, at 
the end of each period, all bidders know the winner of each item and its price. If an item does not 
have any winner, the auctioneer offers again that item at the next round of the auction. 
3.4.2 Bidders 
For each item i, bidder j chooses a value according to its bidding pattern. The value for the item 
could be either zero (not interested) or a number equal or larger than the reserve price  𝑅𝑃!. It is 
assumed the bidders know the reserve price of each item. In a single item auction, for each item i, 
bidder j has a private value vi,j for the item, as defined by equation (1).  𝑣!,!   ∈    𝑅𝑃!   ,𝑀𝑃!,!  (1) 
Equation 1 defines the value interval, where MPi,j shows the maximum price that bidder j is 
willing to pay for item i. This price reflects the price that the bidder is prepared to pay to have a 
minimum profit from the item. Obviously the farther the item is from the mill the smaller the 
maximum price, because of transport costs. According to the characteristics of the item (e.g., 
overall quality of the forest lot), bidders define their maximum prices. For each item i, Vi and Ri 
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show respectively the volume and the type of item. Furthermore, the distance of the item i to 
bidder agent j is shown by Di,j. Equation (2) defines the maximum price MPi,j. 𝑀𝑃!,! = 𝑉!(𝑀𝑅𝑃! − 𝐻𝐶! − 𝐷!,!𝑇𝐶! − 𝑃𝐶!,! − 𝑃𝑅!,!) (2) 
MRPi is the average revenue of the final product generated from item i. HCi is the cost of 
harvesting item i. Di,jTCi is the total transportation cost. The average processing cost of 
converting the product i into the final product of bidder j is PCi,j. Finally, PRi,j is the minimum 
profit that the company is willing to gain from the item.  
3.4.2.1 Bidders’ items selection problem 
At each round, bidders are offered many items. They might consequently be interested in more 
than one item simultaneously. They should therefore decide on which items they want to bid, 
considering the characteristics of the items, including their species, their size and their quality, as 
well as the bidders’ need and the items' distance to their mills. The distance from an item to the 
processing facilities must be considered since transportation accounts for a significant share of 
procurement costs. Bidders must also make sure they have the capacity to process (i.e., harvest 
and transport) the items they bid on. Furthermore, in practice, bidders might be more interested 
on larger volume items. In other words, when companies have access to more volume in the same 
location, they need less coordination with other mills or entrepreneurs, who might be interested in 
buy undesirable species (in case of mixed species lots). Larger volume items might also involves 
scale economies with respect to harvest cost. Therefore, bidders must weight these parameters 
and constraints in order to find the best set of items to bid on. A set of such items is referred to as 
the solution of items to bid on at each round. This best solution represents the mills or 
entrepreneurs list of items that are the most profitable to bid on. It is expected that bidders bid 
according to it. In some cases, bidders may have several possible sets of items to bid on. Bidder 
agents try to find the best solution in their region. The challenge is to establish the option that 
yields the most profit for them. Two opposite problems may arise from the bidding process. On 
the one hand, obtaining more than needed induces unnecessary costs for the bidders, such as 
inventory related costs. On the other hand, bidders can bid on several items and win nothing 
because they have poorly estimated their value or bid too low. This decision problem is defined 
by the following binary integer programing model: 
25 
 
  
maximize:  𝑉!𝐷!   𝑥!     !∈!  (3) 
subject to: 𝑀𝑃!,!   𝑥! ≥ 𝑅𝑃!                 ∀  𝑖 (4) 𝑉!𝑥!!∈! ≤ 𝑁𝐷!                      (5) 𝑥! ∈ 0,1             ∀    𝑖     (6) 
In this model, Vi, Di, and RPi are respectively the volume of item i, the distance of item i from 
the mill, and the reserve price of item i. MPi,j  is the maximum price that bidder j is willing to pay 
for item i. The need of bidder j at time t (i.e., the total volume of wood to acquire) is NDj. Binary 
decision variable xi represents whether or not an item is selected. 
In this formulation, each bidder assigns a weight to each possible item at each round. The weight 
is defined as the volume of the item over the distance of the item to the bidder’s mill, in order to 
maximize the volume while minimizing the distance to obtain it. Therefore, the larger the volume 
and the smaller the distance, the more interesting the item is. Although it is rather simple, this 
interest indicator provides a good guide for bidders to identify interesting items.  
The objective function aims to maximize the total interest of items. The first constraint (4) 
ensures that the bidder consider only the feasible items, for which the maximum price the bidder 
is willing to pay is higher than the reserve price of the item. Constraint (5) states that the sum of 
the selected items is less than its need, in order to avoid bidding on more items than needed. This 
may include a small buffer to account for lost bids. Equation (6) is the integrity constraint.  
3.4.2.2 Approaches for the bidding patterns 
In order to design realistic bidding patterns for simulation purposes, we first developed four pure 
patterns based on fundamental concepts from the literature that we adapted to the specific 
problem of forest auctions. Then, we compared and analyzed the performance of these four 
bidding patterns in order to ultimately develop and hybrid pattern capable of modeling a wide 
range of bidding behaviours. To do so, we assumed that bidders have information concerning past 
auction outcomes, including winners and winning prices of all items. In other words, we 
generally assumed that the information known by bidders is limited to private information and 
public information concerning the results of the previous auctions. The behaviour of bidders 
during in auctions is called the bidding pattern. Five bidding patterns approaches are presented 
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hereafter, respectively random bidding, fixed behaviour, adaptive, learning, and adaptive 
learning.  
3.4.2.2.1 Random bidding approach  
In the random bidding approach, bidders bid randomly a value between a minimum price (or the 
reserve price) and a maximum price. This approach is the most simple pattern as bidders are 
inattentive to past auctions or private information and do not follow any particular logic. Equation 
(7) describes the random bidding approach. In this equation, r is a random number between 0 and 
1. 
 
(7) 
3.4.2.2.2 Fixed behaviour approach 
The second approach is a slight variation of the random bidding approach. Therefore, in the fixed 
behaviour approach, bidders systematically bid according to their risk averseness, as shown in 
equation (8): 
 
(8) 
Here, k is a constant between 0 and 1, which is decided by the bidder before the auction as a fixed 
bidding pattern. In other words, if k=1, then the bidder systematically bid her maximum value 
(i.e., risk averse). On the contrary, if k=0, then the bidder bids her lowest value (i.e., cool-headed).  
3.4.2.2.3 Adaptive approach 
Bidders using the random bidding and the fixed behaviour approaches are Zero Intelligent (ZI) 
agents (Mathieu et al. 2006). In other words, by using any of the first two approaches, bidders bid 
ignoring any internal and external information, such as past auctions wins. Although bidders do 
not know about other bidders’ approaches, they can build a strategy line for themselves using 
private information. Wei et al. (2010) suggest a bidding pattern for multi-round auctions that 
considers the impact of time on the valuation function. Because we assume that bidders have an 
annual supply target to achieve in order to supply their mill with a specific type of wood, we 
exploited this idea to develop an approach that adjusts the valuation function according to the 
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time remaining to achieve that target, but also to the remaining supply need of the bidder at the 
time of the auction. Indeed, the smaller the remaining time a bidder has to achieve her supply 
target, or the smaller the percentage of her target she achieved with previous auctions, the more 
concessions she is likely to make (i.e., the more risk averse she becomes). Consequently, we 
develop the third approach, namely the adaptive approach, in which bidders bid according to their 
perception of the pressure of the remaining time and supply need. In other words, the adaptive 
approach is designed to keep the bid value low, and to only increase it when the pressure to 
achieve the supply target is high.  
Therefore, we define the influence of the remaining time to achieve the supply target (t) and of 
the remaining supply need to achieve the target (n) as a linear increasing function, defined by 
equation (9). 
 
(9) 
Here, 𝑓! 𝑦  and 𝑓! 𝑑  are functions representing respectively the whole year (or time period over 
which the bidder must achieve a specific supply target) and the remaining time until the end of 
the year (or time period). Next, 𝑓!!(n) and 𝑓!!(c) are functions representing respectively the 
remaining supply need at the specific time of the auction, and the overall supply target of the 
bidder. All of these functions are continuously increasing. This valuation reflects a number 
between the minimum price and the maximum price for an item i that a bidder j is willing to pay.  
This type of behaviour can be interpreted in the system as adaptive to the perceived pressure of 
time and supply need, with respect to the bidder's supply target. In other words, at the start of the 
year, bidders offer near minimum price as they have time to achieve their target. However, if their 
target is high, their perception of the pressure to achieve it may force them to bid higher. As the 
auction progresses, bidders have less time and therefore have fewer possibility of winning in the 
next rounds of auctions. Therefore, while they initially accept the risk of losing and decide to bid 
less, as time passes without winning, they will choose to bid more, with less profit, in an attempt 
to increase the likelihood of winning a bid. Figure 3–1 shows some examples. 
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Figure 3–1. Examples of adaptive approach behaviour 
In these examples, each point of each line shows a simulated bid at time t for an item with 
minimum and maximum prices of 50 and 70 respectively. At the start of the simulation, the 
bidder offers near minimum price, as there are still many opportunities to win. As the time 
progresses, if the bidder does not win, she incrementally bids higher. Drop points represent a 
specific win. When the bidder wins an item which volume represents a higher portion of her 
supply target, the drop is larger. When the bidder wins, she starts bidding from drop point, and 
gradually increases her bid until it reaches her maximum price or she wins again. Similarly, an 
early win of an item has a larger drop point than a late win of the same item, unless the supply 
target is achieved by the win. For instance, example 2 shows a bidder that has stopped bidding 
because she won sufficient bids early on. 
3.4.2.2.4 Learning approach 
Recently, agent-learning algorithms have reached remarkable outcomes (Vidal, 2007). The 
purpose of learning in multi-agent systems is to create some agents, which can use previous 
experience for their future bidding (Mitchell, 1997). 
Learning theory leads to many valuable tools (Mathieu et al. 2006). These tools help multi-agent 
researchers to find the achievable equilibrium points of a system. At the design stage of a multi-
agent system, designers do not know exactly every condition that agents will encounter during 
their operations. Therefore, by adding a learning capability to the agents, designers provide their 
agents with the capacity to adapt their behaviour to situations that happen at run time.  
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In sequential auctions, learning is a method that helps bidder agents to build their offers 
according to available information. Learning agents use algorithms to analyze available data to 
bid more carefully. In order to do this, we propose a learning approach, which aims to estimate 
the winning value of an item according to specific parameters, using the results from prior 
auctions, including sale prices, the items' lot sizes, and the winners' location. Using the distance 
between the winners’ mill and the items, the price paid and the characteristics of the items, a 
learning bidder agent runs a regression model to estimate the likely value of new items to be 
auctioned. Such an approach allows bidder agents to identify an ‘average’ winning bidding 
pattern based on past auctions. At each round, learning agents computes the coefficient of the 
regression function 10 , in which 𝑦!,! is the price of item i estimated by bidder j, 𝑑!,! is the 
distance of bidder j to item i,  and x1,j, x2,j, x3,j and x4,j are the volumes of the four species/quality 
combination considered in this study.  
 
(10) 
3.4.2.2.5 Adaptive learning approach  
Out of the four bidding patterns presented above, only the last two strategies proposed some sort 
of bidding behaviour that changes over time according to specific, yet different, information input. 
The adaptive approach adjusts the valuation function according to bidder's objectives and the 
time left to achieve it. The learning approach only adjusts the valuation function according to past 
winning conditions. If these two behaviours seem to follow reasonable bidding rationalities, a 
rational bidder can adopt any bidding pattern that is between these two. Therefore, we introduced 
a fifth approach that is a hybrid of both the third (adaptive) and fourth (learning) approaches. 
More specifically, the valuation function of such a bidder is described by the equation (11). 
 
(11) 
 In this equation, α and 𝛽  are coefficients defined within [0;1]. With such a hybridisation 
mechanism, the pure adaptive and learning bidding patterns can be reproduced. For instance, 
when α = 𝛽 = 1, the bidder behaves like a pure adaptive bidder. When α = 𝛽 = 0, the bidder 
agent behaves like a the pure learning bidder. This mechanism also allows creating bidder agents 
30 
 
  
that equally demonstrate both behaviours simultaneously. In other words, when α = 1 and 𝛽 = 0, 
the valuation function of the pure learning agent is adjusted by the pressure of target achievement 
as with the adaptive behaviour. On the contrary, when α = 0 and 𝛽 = 1, the hybrid agent behave 
simply as a risk neutral bidder agent with a fixed behaviour. 
3.5 Experiments 
Several experiments were carried out in order to validate and analyze different aspects of the 
proposed model. The first two experiments were designed specifically to validate the 
programmed behaviors of the bidder agents. In the first experiment, we compared the four pure 
bidding patterns and analyse the results to make sure that the overall outcome of each strategies 
was coherent with their design specificities. Similarly, the second experiment was designed to 
validate the hybrid approach, and to compare, in a competitive setup, different configurations of 
hybrid bidder agents (from the pure adaptive to learning). 
Next, in a third part, we carried out an experiment to better understand the impacts of various 
auction design parameters on the outcome of the auction. This experiment was specifically 
designed with randomly generated populations of hybrid bidder agents. A factorial design plan of 
81 scenarios was implemented and simulated in order to understand the impacts of specific 
auction design parameters, including average lot size, periodicity, number of item sold and 
number of bidders. The results of this experiment were validated separately with experts from the 
Bureau de mise en marché des bois of the Québec government. 
3.5.1 Methodology of experiments 
The methodology we used to achieve the objectives of the study includes 3 experiments. In the 
first two experiments, four different scenarios were simulated. Each scenario is a combination of 
a number of potential bidders and an average lot size. Scenarios with different number of bidders 
are used to assess the impact of more or less competition on the auctions outcome, while 
scenarios with different average lot sizes are used to assess the impact of the average item size on 
supply target achievement. In each scenario of the first experiment, there are an equal number of 
bidder agents using each type of bidding patterns. In the second experiment, we simulated and 
compared the same four scenarios with a set of bidder agents containing an equal number of each 
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five configurations of hybrid bidder agent, as described in Table 3–1. Finally, in the third 
experiment, a factorial design plan was used as the combinations of three levels of average lot 
size, three levels of periodicity, three levels of number of item sold, and three levels of number of 
bidders. 
Table 3–1. Defining five configurations by assigning different α and β 
            𝛼 𝛽           1 0.75 0.5 0.25 0 
1 Adaptive approach (1)     
0.75    (4)  
0.5   (3)   
0.25  (2)    
0     Learning Approach (5)  
  
3.5.2 Random parameters and common elements 
For all experiments, the locations of bidders' mills and sold items are randomly generated. 
Transportation costs are calculated based on the Euclidian distance between items and mills. 
Other random parameters were generated by uniform distribution including lot size; volumes of 
hardwood and softwood of quality 1 and 2 in each item; process cost at each mills; annual 
production capacity of each bidder's mill; bidders' initial supply targets; and market price of each 
wood product made of hardwood and softwood of quality 1 and 2. 
Because each bidder is generally interested in only one combination of species/quality, the 
market price is different for each combination of species/quality and for each bidder. Therefore, 
the market price is set to be lower for the species/quality the bidder does not want. It is equivalent 
to the price of the unprocessed wood in the market, plus transportation cost to the mill. Because 
market price affects the valuation function through equation 2, if an item contains a large volume 
of uninteresting species/quality, the resulting bid is lower. This assumption is realistic because we 
consider that in case of a win, the unused species/quality volumes are sold to other mills without 
any loss. 
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A simulation run consists in a 365 time period simulation, in which bidder agents have a unique 
bidding pattern according to the tested scenario. Each bidder agent is defined by specific public 
and private parameters including a mill location, a supply target to achieve and a set of cost and 
revenue functions. In order to obtain a relevant level of statistical significance, each simulation of 
each experiment was repeated several times. Also, a simple Taboo Search application was 
programmed in the simulation platform to solve the Bidders' items selection problem described in 
Section 3.4.2.1. This algorithm was used by all bidder agents in every simulation. 
Next, in order to analyse the influence of specific design parameters, the average sale price per 
m3 and the average target achievement of each simulation runs were measured. In the context of 
public land, the designer of the auction process is interested in both aspects of the auction 
outcome. More specifically, the average target achievement is a criterion that measures how 
much bidders are able to fulfill their needs. In other words, it measures the impact of the auction 
process on the sustainability of mills' economic activities. Target achievement of a bidder is 
defined as the volumes of all items won by the bidder during the entire simulation over its supply 
target. Next, the average sale price represents public economical gain from the auction process. In 
other words, although the auction process must be designed to generate a large economical gain 
in the interest of the public, it cannot do so at the expense of local economic sustainability. 
3.5.3 Synthesis of the experiments 
As summarized in Table 3–2, the first part of the experiments focused on the validation of the 
agents' behaviours. A total of 280 simulation runs were carried out. The second part studies the 
impacts of various auction design parameters on the outcome of the auction. 1900 simulation runs 
were carried out and analyzed. The next section presents and discusses the results. 
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Table 3–2. Experimental design specificities 
 # of scenarios # of repetitions # of simulation 
Part 1: Behaviour validation experiments 
1 2 parameters, 4 scenarios Each scenario was repeated 50 times 200 
• number of bidders 2 levels (100 and 200)  
• average lot size  2 levels (10,000 m3 and 20,000 m3).  
2 2 parameters, 4 scenarios Each scenario was repeated 20 times 80 
• number of bidders 2 levels (100 and 200)  
• average lot size  2 levels (10,000 m3 and 20,000 m3).  
Part 2: Auction design experiments 
3 4 parameters, 81 scenarios Each scenario was repeated 20 times 1620 
• auction periodicity 3 levels (7 days, 15 days and 30 days)  
• average lot size 3 levels (10.000 m3, 15.000 m3 and 
20.000 m3), 
 
• number of items sold 3 levels (100, 250 and 500),  
• number of bidders 3 levels (100, 150 and 200),  
 
3.6 Results and discussion 
This section presents and discusses each experiment. Although more experiments were carried 
out during the development phases of the simulation platform, only the results of the mentioned 
experiments are analyzed in this paper. 
3.6.1 Experiment 1 
In this experiment, the average price is first considered to compare the four bidding patterns. 
Figure 3–2 shows the average sale price per m3 of the four approaches in all tested scenarios. 
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Figure 3–2. Average sale price per m3 of four approaches in different setup configuration 
First, we can observe that bidders with strategies 1 and 2 pay, on average, more than the last two 
strategies, which is consistent with the development objectives. Indeed, a bidder using pattern 3 
(i.e., the adaptive approach) bids systematically low, unless it is under pressure of achieving its 
supply target. Similarly, a bidder using the fourth pattern only bids what is likely necessary to 
win, and not more. This pattern is also more adapted than the third to achieve lower buying prices. 
Indeed, as seen in Figure 3–2, bidders using approach 3 pay a higher price than the bidders using 
approach 4, except in the situation where the competition is lower and the lots are larger (NB 100, 
LS 20.000). In this specific case, when an adaptive bidder wins an item, because the large volume 
of the item represents a larger portion of its supply target, its next bid will be lower than if the 
item represented a smaller portion of its need. Therefore, based on the price paid per m3, the 
learning approach is better than all other approaches in almost every configuration. However, the 
price in the adaptive approach is almost equivalent to the price in the learning approach when the 
competition is low and the lots are bigger. This validates what we intended to program. Similarly, 
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comparing the first scenario with the second, and the third scenario with the fourth, we can also 
observe that price paid seems to be less when items are bigger. This result, to be confirmed by the 
fourth experiments, is a first indicator on how to design the auction in order to maximize revenue 
from the seller point of view. The second aspect that we analyzed in these experiments is the 
average target achievement as seen in Figure 3-3. 
  
Figure 3–3. Average target achievement of four approaches in different setup 
configurations 
Here, the average target achievement displays a similar general trend in all scenarios. Bidders 
using approach 2 have the lowest average target achievement. This is caused by the inability of 
their pattern to adapt the bid to win an item (not even by generating randomly a high bid like 
approach 1). Also, approaches 1 and 3 are able to generate a better target achievement than the 
other approaches. Although the target achievement of approach 1 and approach 3 are equivalent, 
it seems that bidders using approach 1 are only able to obtain a good target achievement by 
sometime generating higher winning bids. Therefore, they do so at the expense of their average 
paid price, which is much higher than bidders using approach 3 (see Figure 3–2). On the same 
token, bidders using the adaptive approach 3 are able to achieve lower paid price because they 
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only increase their bids when needed (pressure to achieve the target). These bidders also 
outperform the bidders using the learning approach 4, because their bidding patterns controls the 
bid so as to improve target achievement, while the learning approach is insensitive to target 
achievement. These results, again, validate what we intended to program. .  
In general, as shown in Figure 3–2 and Figure 3-3, bidders using approaches 1 and 2 tend to pay 
higher for the items in comparison to bidders using approaches 3 and 4. This occurs also while 
they do not necessarily achieve a better target achievement compared to bidders using approaches 
3 and 4. As a result, the learning approach bidders pay less for the item, while the adaptive 
approach bidders have a better target achievement. Therefore, according to their objective, 
bidders should use any combination of these two approaches. This is why, in the remaining 
experiments, approaches 1 and 2 were abandoned, as they do not try to achieve any particular 
objective. 
3.6.2 Experiment 2 
In order to better understand the impacts of combining the adaptive and the learning bidding 
patterns, we carried out another experiment dedicated to validating this type of hybrid bidder 
agents. In order to see how this approach performs, we considered and compared 5 combinations 
of the adaptive and learning approaches, with different α and 𝛽 as explained in Table 3–2. Note 
that the pure adaptive and learning approaches were included in this experiment. As studied in 
experiment 1, we compared the average price per m3 and the average target achievement. As 
shown in Figure 3–4 and Figure 3-5, there are no absolute best hybrid bidder agents. However, 
the performance of the approaches is different in each of the four simulated scenarios. For 
instance, target achievement (Figure 3–4) seems generally more correlated to the scenario, than to 
the type of hybrid combination. However, in more competitive scenarios, the more adaptive the 
bidder agent is, the (slightly) better its target achievement. In less competitive scenarios, this 
advantage of the adaptive behaviour seems to fade, especially with respect to the learning bidder 
agents, which actually perform well, which is rather different from the results of the first 
experiment. This can be explained by the nature of the competitive game. In other words, the 
auctions simulated in the second experiment are more competitive than the auctions in the first. 
Indeed, in the second experiment, all bidder agents present some more or less pronounced 
capacity to adapt to achieve their supply target objective. However, this was not the case in 
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experiment 1, in which bidder agents using approach 1 and 2 were incapable of adapting to the 
situation. Therefore, these agents were more prone to loose against more intelligent agents. 
Consequently, pure adaptive agents were not necessarily better than the hybrid agents from that 
perspective.  
 
Figure 3–4: Average target achievement of five approaches in different setup 
configurations 
Concerning the average sale price (Figure 3-5), several observations can be made. First, because 
an adaptive agent under pressure can offer bids that are higher than necessary to win an item, it is 
coherent to observe a poor performance of these agents to achieve a good sale price in a 
competitive game (BN 200, LS 10.000). However, when the game is less competitive (NB 100, 
LS 20.000), then adaptive agents actually perform well because they are designed to keep their 
bid as low as possible when not under pressure. This general result can be observed with hybrid 
agents as well. However, we can noticed that because hybrid 2, 3 and 4 are respectively defined 
with an incremental decrease of 𝛼 from equation (11), and therefore an incremental decrease of 
the influence of the adaptive behaviour, it is coherent to observe a performance of these agents 
that becomes also incrementally further to the performance of the pure adaptive behaviour. In 
other words, the less a hybrid agent is influenced by the adaptive behaviour, the less sensitive to 
competition it is to achieving good sale prices. This also confirms the findings of the first 
experiment, which, compared to the learning approach, the adaptive approach has a stronger 
negative impact on the sale price, than it has a positive impact on target achievement. 
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Figure 3–5. Average sale price of five approaches in different setup configuration 
As expected, the observed performance of the different types of hybrid agent is generally 
correlated to how much of the pure behaviours they are made of. However, it seems that the 
influence of the adaptive behaviour is more significant than the influence of the learning 
behaviour, although they all display an almost equally good performance with respect to target 
achievement. Therefore we can safely assume that the generation of a population of randomly 
generated hybrid agents is representative of a population of rational bidders driven by any 
combination of both objectives. 
3.6.3 Experiments 3 
As discussed earlier, experiment 3 aims to better understand the influence of several auction 
design parameters on the outcome of the auction. In order to design such an auction, the designer 
needs to define the number of auctions per year, the average lot size of the items for sale, the 
periodicity of the auction, and, as far as possible, influence the number of bidders by, for 
instance, selecting lots' location in a strategic manner. These are referred to as the independent 
variable. From the seller's point of view, these design parameters should be defined in a way to 
maximize the revenue. However, because the seller is also the Québec government, it must make 
sure forest companies can operate at sufficient capacity to cover their fixed cost of operation by 
allowing them to be supplied with large enough quantity of timber. Therefore, as discussed 
previously, both the average price and the target achievement must be studied. These are referred 
to as the dependant variables. 
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As explained in the methodological section, experiment 3 is an extensive simulation of 81 
different scenarios defined as the combination of various levels of number of bidders, item lot 
size, periodicity, and number of items sold as presented in Table 3–2. Using the data generated by 
the experiments, we carried out several analyses. First, an analysis of variance presented in the 
annexe (Table 3–3 and Table 3–4) validates statistically the results generated by the simulation 
model. For simplification purpose, this analysis only studies the influences of all combinations of 
just any two independent variables on both dependant variables. Both ANOVA studies present a 
R-square above .95, which indicates a high significant level of statistical confidence. Next, in 
order to better understand the combined influence of any two independent variables on the 
outcome of the auction, we systematically computed the average target achievement and sale 
price for the combination of all levels of all pairs of two design parameters. 
First, from a general standpoint, all results show systematic opposite effects of all design 
parameters on both outcomes. For instance, lot size affects positively target achievement and 
negatively sale price (Figure 3–6). More specifically, when item size gets larger, the sale price 
per m3 decreases from $9 to, sometime, $4.5, which is rather considerable. This can be explained 
by the difference in the quantity of bidders interested in bidding. Indeed, large size items are not 
necessarily interesting to bidders with remaining supply needs smaller than the lot size. In other 
words, if items lot size are small, then the number of potential bidders for this item increases, 
which increases competition. Consequently, more participation in the auction causes more 
demand, which in turn affects the sale price. This result presents a limit of the model to be 
improved, as it is counter-intuitive for the experts who validated the model. Indeed, in this model, 
we consider a fix harvesting cost per m3, although in reality, a scale economy can be gained from 
harvesting larger items (e.g., less low bed transportation are needed to move harvesting 
equipment). Therefore, if a scale economy can be gained from larger items, then bidders might be 
willing to pay more to win these items. Although this shortcoming limits our ability to investigate 
properly the impact of item size, it does not affect the remaining of the study insofar as the lot 
sizes of each simulation configuration are within a limited range. In other words, within each 
round of auctions, because the lot sizes are similar, no scale economy is significantly higher for 
some items. Therefore, these items are less interesting from that perceptive. However, if both 
small and large items are simultaneously sold within one round of auctions, then a fix cost of 
harvesting should be considered.  
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a). Target achievement: combined effects of 
periodicity and lot size 
 
b). Price per m3: combined effects of 
periodicity and lot size 
 
c). Target achievement: combined effects of 
number of bidders and lot size 
 
d). Price per m3: combined effects of number 
of bidders and lot size 
 
e). Target achievement: combined effects of 
number of auctions and lot size 
 
f). Price per m3: combined effects of number of 
auctions and lot size 
Figure 3–6. Comparative analysis of target achievement and sale price (Part 1) 
Along the same line, if lot size has a rather clear general influence on both outcomes, this 
influence is mitigated to different extents by the other design parameters. For instance, periodicity 
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(i.e., the delay between two rounds of auctions) has a rather limited influence for values below 15 
days. Indeed, as verified in the statistical analysis, there is no significant statistical difference 
between the simulation results with a periodicity of 7 days and a periodicity of 15 (Figure 3–6, a., 
b. and Figure 3-7, a., b., c., d.). However, a periodicity of 30 days between two rounds of auctions 
tends to decrease both target achievement and sale price. Therefore, shorter periodicities tend to 
be generally more beneficial than longer ones. This influence can be explained as follows. When 
periodicity increases, while the total number of auctions remains unchanged, the number of items 
for sale increases at each round. In other words, there are fewer rounds of auctions, but more 
auctions at each round. Consequently, the influence of periodicity on sale price target 
achievement can be explained by the fact that bidders can achieve lesser price if they can bid 
simultaneously on more items (i.e., more supply quantities per round). 
Along the same line, and from a general standpoint, the number of auctions affects positively 
target achievement, and negatively sale price. Furthermore, it has a mitigating effect on both the 
lot size and the number of bidders. More specifically, as the number of auctions decreases, the 
influence of lot size (Figure 3–6, f.) and the influence of the number of bidders (Figure 3-7, f.) on 
sale price are reduced as well. For the same reason, this can be explained by the fact that reduced 
supply leads to a higher number of interested bidders, even if the items' lot size is large or the 
number of potential bidders is low. This result is interesting because it shows that higher 
competition, in other words, a higher number of interested bidders, with respect to a certain level 
of supply, leads to a market price that better represents the limit of forest companies to purchase 
items. 
Differently, and as expected, the number of bidders has a positive impact on sale price, but a 
negative impact on target achievement, whatever the context (Figure 3–6, c., d. and Figure 3-7, a., 
b., e., and f.). This result can be explained as follow. As competition and demand increase, the 
number of bids received during each auction is similarly increased, which results in a higher 
probability of receiving high value bids. Along the same line, increased competition also reduces 
the probability of each forest company to win, and therefore reduces their ability to achieving 
their target.  
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a). Target achievement: combined effects of 
periodicity and number of bidders 
 
b). Price per m3: combined effects of 
periodicity and number of bidders 
 
c). Target achievement: combined effects of 
periodicity and number of auctions 
 
d). Price per m3: combined effects of 
periodicity and number of auctions 
 
e). Target achievement: combined effects of 
number of bidders and numbers of auctions 
 
f). Price per m3: combined effects of number of 
bidders and numbers of auctions 
Figure 3–7: Comparative analysis of target achievement and sale price (Part 2) 
Finally, we also studied the correlation between the target achievement and the sale price (results 
not presented). As it can easily be observed in Figure 3–6 and Figure 3-7, this correlation is 
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negative, which tends to show that both objectives cannot be achieved simultaneously. In other 
words, it seems that the government that owns the forest has a dilemma as it can either maximize 
its revenue, or support the industry by allowing companies to better achieve their supply target, 
but not both.  
3.7 Conclusion 
This paper first proposed theoretical bidding patterns for the design of automated software agents 
in the context of natural resource auctions. These bidding patterns were then implemented into a 
multi-agent simulation platform, which was used in various simulation contexts in order to 
validate these models, as well as to better understand the impact of various auctions design 
parameters on the auction performance. This performance was measured through two main 
indicators illustrating, on the one hand, the forest companies’ ability to achieve their supply needs 
(i.e., target achievement), and, on the other hand, the government's ability to generate revenue 
from the forest sales (i.e., sales price per m3). 
The analysis of the results first shows that the adaptive and learning bidding patterns have the 
best results and achieve their design objectives. They can thus be used as general guidelines in 
designing a company's bidding pattern. Next, concerning the design of the auction process, the 
results tend to indicate that the government (i.e., the forest owner) cannot simultaneously achieve 
high revenue while providing an effective supply channel to forest companies. It is therefore 
necessary to find a compromise in order to maintain forest companies' activities, and generate 
descent revenue for the public. The results also demonstrate the intuitive impact of the number of 
potential bidders on the revenue generated. It also shows that target achievement is improved by 
the sales of larger forest lots, while it decreases the average sales price. 
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3.9 Annexes 
Table 3–3. Analysis of variance of Price per m3 
Number of observations = 1620 R-squared = 0.9687 
Root MSE = .320843 Adjusted R-squared = 0.9681 
Source Partial SS DF MS F Prob > F 
Model 5061.57087 32 158.17409 1536.56 0.0000 
Lot size 503.714321 2 251.85716 2446.63 0.0000 
Periodicity 262.610509 2 131.305255 1275.55 0.0000 
Lot size # Periodicity 13.0142071 4 3.25355179 31.61 0.0000 
Number of Bidders 999.679136 2 499.839568 4855.62 0.0000 
Lot size # Number of 
Bidders 
21.4218789 4 5.35546972 52.02 0.0000 
Number of Auction 2855.00328 2 1427.50164 13867.27 0.0000 
Lot size # Number of 
Auction 
172.841574 4 43.2103934 419.76 0.0000 
Periodicity # Number of 
Bidders 
12.7947761 4 3.19869404 31.07 0.0000 
Periodicity # Number of 
Auction 
103.995341 4 25.9988354 252.56 0.0000 
Number of Bidders # 
Number of Auction 
116.495846 4 29.1239614 282.92 0.0000 
Residual 163.366382 1587 10294038   
Total 5224.93725 1619 3.22726204   
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Table 3–4. Analysis of variance of Target Achievement 
Number of observations = 1620 R-squared = 0.9844 
Root MSE = .025587 Adjusted R-squared = 0.9841 
Source Partial SS DF MS F Prob > F 
Model 65.6814675 32 2.05254586 3135.01 0.0000 
Lot size 6.8359268 2 3.4179634 5220.52 0.0000 
Periodicity .710617117 2 .355308558 542.69 0.0000 
Lot size # Periodicity .003363833 4 .000840958 1.28 0.2739 
Number of Bidders 7.43414058 2 3.71707029 5677.37 0.0000 
Lot size # Number of 
Bidders 
.039392754 4 .009848189 15.04 0.0000 
Number of Auction 49.977939 2 24.9889695 38167.57 0.0000 
Lot size # Number of 
Auction 
.293985382 4 .073496345 112.26 0.0000 
Periodicity # Number of 
Bidders 
.001303433 4 .000325858 0.50 0.7374 
Periodicity # Number of 
Auction 
.13328915 4 .033322288 50.90 0.0000 
Number of Bidders # 
Number of Auction 
.251509432 4 .062877358 96.04 0.0000 
Residual 1.0390365 1587 .000654717   
Total 66.720504 1619 .041210935   
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CHAPTER 4 : ARTICLE 2 : AGENT-BASED SIMULATION OF MULTI-
ROUND TIMBER COMBINATORIAL AUCTION 
Abstract: 
This paper presents a simulation-based analysis of a multiple-round timber combinatorial auction 
in the timber industry. Currently, most timber auctions are single unit auctions (i.e., each forest 
stand is sold separately). However, other types of auctions could be applied in order to take 
advantage of the various needs of the bidders with respect to species, volumes and quality. This 
study aims to analyze the use of combinatorial auction to this specific context using a simulation 
approach. Various number of auctions per year, periodicity, lot size, and number of bidders are 
considered as parameters to setup the different market configurations. The outcomes of both 
combinatorial auction and single unit auction are compared with respect to different setup 
configurations. In particular, this analysis shows that combinatorial auction can bring more profit 
for both seller and buyer when the market is less competitive.  
Keywords: Timber auction, combinatorial auction, learning strategy, multi-agent simulation 
4.1 Introduction 
 Several problems plagued the timber market in Québec in recent years: decrease in forest 
activities, drop in lumber sales, and constrained access to wood supplies. One of the issues relates 
specifically to the long-term exclusive timber licences: the wood supplies of a timber licence may 
not always match the company’s needs at a specific time. Consequently, allocating timber access 
to suitable companies for a defined time period has been one of the main problems for the Québec 
government. In the new forest regime now in place in Québec, auctions are applied in order to 
assign 25% of the timber lots that were previously assigned through licencing. This new regime 
results in a more flexible access to timber, as well as a price index that will be used to establish 
timber licence prices. 
There exist two main types of auctions for timber allocations: single-unit auctions and 
combinatorial auctions. On the one hand, in a single-unit auction, the seller aims to sell the whole 
lot to one bidder. Currently, most timber auctions use the single-unit method because of its ease 
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of implementation. When the winner of each lot is announced, the winner has a specific time 
period to access the lot according to its need. The Québec government uses single-unit auctions to 
allocate timber access to buyers who are willing to pay more for entire lots.  
On the other hand, timber combinatorial auctions may have some advantages over single-unit 
auctions. These more complex auctions allow bidders to bid on any combination (bundle) of 
items according to their needs. Here, items are not geographically defined forest stands. They can 
be defined, for example, as specific volumes (lots) of a specific mix of species and quality within 
a given stand. Therefore, mixed forest stands can be sold to potential users. In order to identify 
the winners, the auctioneer must compute the highest value of the bundles. Once identified, the 
winners must agree on a specific time to harvest the stand in which they share the access.  
In this paper, timber combinatorial auctions are studied as an interaction procedure between an 
auctioneering agent and several bidding agents to assign timber quantities. The auctioneer, i.e. 
government agents, announces several different lots with defined types of products (i.e., mixed of 
species and quality) to the market on a regular basis through combinatorial auctions. The bidders 
(i.e., forest companies and entrepreneur agents) offer sealed bids for any bundle of products of 
the lots that are announced at each round. The bidders are not allowed to change their offers after 
submitting their bids. As mentioned above, the auctioneer chooses the winners according to the 
highest value of the bundles, and the bidders must agree on a specific time to harvest the stand. In 
order to study these interactions and this type of procedure, a simulation model was developed. 
The simulation model needs a framework to follow the dynamics of the auctions systems over the 
course of several rounds. Agent-based modeling was used to design and implement different 
agent behaviours. In other words, it was used to simulate realistic bidding agents, auctioneer 
agent, and auction mechanisms, including realistic bidding patterns and auctioneer’s winner 
determination process.  
This paper, which extends Farnia et al. (2013), explores how the outcomes of combinatorial 
auctions in terms of selling price per m3 (revenue of the seller) and bidders’ target achievement 
can change in different setup configurations. In addition, the study compares the revenue stream 
of the seller and the target achievement of the bidders of combinatorial auctions and single-unit 
auctions using several simulations.  
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, the theoretical background is 
presented in details. The research objective is described in Section 3. In Section 4, the simulated 
multi-period timber combinatorial auction model is described. Results and discussions including 
four different experiments are presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and 
presents a brief overview of future research. 
4.2 Theoretical background and research objectives 
Limited natural resources such as oil, mineral rights, radio spectrum, and timber have been 
studied regarding policies and mechanisms used to allocate and value them. Timber allocation 
and pricing is of specific interest in Québec, as well as in several jurisdictions in the world. Many 
auction models have been used to solve timber allocation problems, (Mead, 1967; Hansen, 1985; 
Paarsch, 1991; Elyakime et al., 1994, 1997; Baldwin et al., 1997; Athey and Levin, 2001; Haile, 
2001; Athey et al., 2011). These studies are mostly related to the areas of competition and 
information, comparing open and closed auctions, collusion, and reserve price. Others, described 
below, are more specifically related to our study in multiple-round combinatorial timber auction. 
Farnia et al. (2013) studied multiple-round single-unit timber auctions using simulation. The 
authors studied the effects of several bidding patterns on the auction outcome. Their results 
suggests that the adaptive and learning bidding patterns have the best outcome. They also 
analyzed how this outcome is affected by different setup configurations.  
Cramton et al. (2006) described a timber combinatorial auction model as a method of assigning 
products to buyers. However they did not compare the single unit auction with combinatorial 
auction. In a timber combinatorial auction, there are several types of products (e.g., species) for 
sale, and bidders can bid on any bundle of these products. The bundle of bids that maximizes 
their combined value defines the winning bids. Combinatorial auctions can be used in many 
applications. Resource allocation is a type of problem that can be solved through combinatorial 
auction, e.g., allocating airport landing time periods to airlines (i.e. Rassenti et al., 1982; 
Ghassemi Tari and Alaei, 2013; Wang and Dargahi, 2013). Combinatorial auctions are also 
useful for scheduling problems of loading cranes in maritime terminals (i.e. Brewer, 1999; De 
Vries and Vohra, 2003; Cramton et al., 2006; Jung and Kim, 2006). 
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Multiple-round auctions are a series of any type of auctions that are announced sequentially. At 
each round, one or many auctions are announced simultaneously. Once a round is completed and 
the winners identified, the auctioneer announces (potentially after a delay) new auctions 
(Grossklags et al., 2000). In the case of a multiple-round combinatorial auction, each auction 
includes several types of products and bidders bid sequentially on any bundle of products. This 
type of auction is used in Lau et al. (2007) in order to solve a large-scale scheduling problem. In 
their model, to schedule jobs to the bidders, each job agent submits a determined list of jobs using 
multiple-round combinatorial auction. Along the same line, Kwon et al. (2005) proposed a 
multiple-round combinatorial auction for truckload procurement that can be beneficial for both 
carriers and shippers by assigning better service allocations. 
Multi-agent simulation is an efficient method to simulate and analyze auction systems (Vidal, 
2007). It allows investigating the complex interactions among different kinds of agents and can 
handle different types of large-scale data, a common occurrence in combinatorial auctions. 
Moreover, investigating bidder’s behavior and winner selection can be performed as modeling the 
multi-agent simulation platform. One of the challenges in designing and simulating auction 
systems is the randomness of the parameters of the simulated auction model (Shoham and 
Leyton-Brown, 2009). We are aware of few papers that have been published regarding 
combinatorial auction using agent-based systems. For example, Kutanglui and Wu (2001) used 
combinatorial auction as an autonomous distributed scheduling system.  
Finally, Farnia et al. (2015) presents a time-based timber combinatorial auction. To the basic 
timber criteria (i.e., quality and species), the authors add a timetable as a criterion in order to 
address harvest operations coordination directly in the winner determination process. However, 
experiments are limited to simulations of one combinatorial auction at a time, in order to study 
the impacts of various behaviors on the auction outcome. To our knowledge, there is no study of 
multiple-round timber combinatorial auctions. Also, as the literature reviewed, there are not any 
studies about the efficiency comparison of multiple-round combinatorial auctions and multiple–
round single unit auctions. This paper aims to fill this gap. 
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4.3 Research objectives 
In this paper, several configurations of multiple-round combinatorial auctions are studied using 
agent-based simulation. The basic simulation model consists in several sets of combinatorial 
auctions that are announced sequentially in multiple rounds. Within each round, each set of 
auctions is announced simultaneously. In this paper, the first goal is to investigate the effect of 
several configurations of the basic model on the outcome of the combinatorial auctions, i.e. price 
per m3, and on the achievement level of the purchase volume target of the bidders. Furthermore, 
the goal of this study is to analyze the difference between multiple-round combinatorial auctions 
and multiple- round single-unit auctions in several configurations of the basic combinatorial 
auction model. 
4.4 Multiple-round timber combinatorial auction 
The proposed simulation model involves three components: an auctioneer, a seller, and bidders. 
The auctioneer, or government agency, manages the announcement and controls the auction as 
well as the Attribution process. The seller, the State in our case, offers timber products to the 
market. The bidders are the auction participants.  
In this model, combinatorial auctions are used to sell forest stands. We assumed that each forest 
stand consists of four different species. The species are divided into softwood and hardwood, 
each with two levels of qualities. Therefore there are four different types of products, including 
softwood of quality one (s1), softwood of quality two (s2), hardwood of quality one (h1), and 
hardwood of quality two (h2). In order to make the model more realistic, each lot has other 
specifications that make them different from each other. These specifications include the location 
of the forest stand and the volume of each species. The location of each forest stand is randomly 
defined during simulation, while their lot size (i.e., size of forest stand) is defined at the start of 
the simulation. The volumes by species are randomly defined according to the lot size.  
There are three types of bidders in this model: softwood mills, hardwood mills, and entrepreneurs. 
This segmentation is done according to the supply need of the bidders. Softwood mills require 
softwood, and include lumber mills and paper mills. Hardwood mills are interested in hardwoods. 
Entrepreneurs are interested in both softwood and hardwood products. In our model, it is 
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considered that softwood mills mostly bid for the bundles that include s1 and s2, where s1 is 
softwood with quality 1 and s2 is softwood with quality 2. These bundles are considered as s1, s2, 
s1s2, and s1s2h1h2. Large softwood mills might bid for s1, s2, or any bundle that contains s1 and 
s2, while small softwood mills might bid only for either s1 or s2. If a softwood mill wins bundle 
s1s2h1h2, the mill resale the undesired volumes to other mills. The illustrated example also 
applies for hardwood mills that may be interested in h1, h2, h1h2, and s1s2h1h2. The 
entrepreneurs are also interested in any bundles of s1, s2, h1, and h2. In order to simplify the 
simulation model, and particularly the winner determination process, as well as to reduce the 
number of combinations that significantly increases running time, entrepreneurs only bid for s1, 
s2, s1s2, h1, h2, h1h2, and s1s2h1h2 bundles. 
The parameters of bidder agents include the type of bidder, its location, its capacity per year 
(which defines their total need), supply needs for each species per year, and their own market 
prices (i.e., the selling price of their own products). In this simulation model, we also define 
several parameters that define the configuration of the auctions and the auction environment. 
These parameters include: number of auctions per year, auction periodicity, number of bidders 
and lot size. Other parameters of the model are either random within a realistic range, or fixed.  
The general simulation procedure is the following. The products of several forest stands are sold 
over the simulation horizon (one year) via combinatorial auctions. The products of each stand are 
sold simultaneously during one single combinatorial auction. In other words, each stand is sold 
individually with one combinatorial auction, which is announced and processed individually. At 
the start of the simulation, the auctioneer announces several combinatorial auctions 
simultaneously. So each combinatorial auction concerns one specific forest stand, and bidders bid 
on any bundle of that stand. The auctioneer announces the available products specifying the 
volume of each species and the location of the corresponding stand. In order to simplify the 
simulation of the auction, the reserve price of each bundle is also announced, although in the case 
study on which we base our simulation this information remains private. For each auction, the 
bidders bid on any combination of products composing the stand. After receiving the bids, the 
auctioneer chooses the winners according to a winner determination algorithm, which is 
explained in section 4.2. Because the auction is combinatorial, each stand may be assigned to one 
or more bidders. After announcing the winners, the bidders must coordinate harvest operations. 
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The supply needs of the winners are updated according to the product allocation, which affects 
their behaviour in the remaining rounds of auction. Therefore, bidder agents must be able to adapt 
their bidding behaviour over the course of multiple-round auctions. This adaptive learning 
bidding approach is presented in section 4.4.1. 
4.4.1 Bidding approach 
 In order to have realistic simulation, the bidding pattern inspired by Farnia et al. (2013) uses an 
adaptive learning approach in the context of a single unit auction. This approach combines two 
types of behavior: a learning behavior and an adaptive behavior. Similarly to Farnia et al. (2013), 
we compare the adaptive learning behavior with other realistic approaches. On the one hand, the 
learning behavior considers the history (i.e., past rounds of the auction) to define a bidding 
function, which aim is to avoid over-bidding. This behavior was deemed the most profitable for 
the bidder. On the other hand, the adaptive behavior considers the bidder’s current needs and the 
time left to fulfill the remaining needs. This bidding behavior was the most capable of fulfilling 
supply needs. As mentioned in section 3, the bidders must value each bundle of products in the 
lot under consideration. The sets and indexes to calculate the value of each bundle are indicated 
in Table 4–1.  
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The bidders need to calculate their maximum and minimum values for each bundle. The 
minimum value of bidder j for bundle S is considered to be equal to the reserve price of bundle S. 
The reserve price of bundle S is equal to the sum of the reserve prices of the species including in 
that bundle. The maximum value of bidder j for bundle S is shown in equation (1).  𝑀𝑃!,! = 𝑉!(𝑀𝑅𝑃! − 𝐻𝐶! − 𝐷!,!𝑇𝐶! − 𝑃𝐶!,! − 𝑃𝑅!,!) (1) 
 
As described in Farnia et al. (2013) the bidders may face several combinatorial auctions at each 
round of the auction. Therefore the bidders should consider a decision method to decide on which 
Table 4–1: Sets and indexes of the model  𝑗 bidders  𝑖 ∈ 𝐺 set of lots 𝑆 ⊆ 𝐺 bundles of lots  𝑀𝑃!,! maximum price of bidder j for bundle S 𝑁𝑃!,! minimum price of bidder j for bundle S 𝑅𝑃! reserve price of bundle S 𝑉! volume of bundle S 𝑀𝑅𝑃! average revenue of the final products made from S; 
includes the revenue of the direct resale of undesired 
species. 𝐻𝐶! harvest cost of bundle S 𝐷!,! distance of the bundle S to bidder j 𝑇𝐶! transportation cost of bundle S 𝑃𝐶!,! average processing cost of converting the bundle S into 
the final product of bidder j 𝑃𝑅!,! minimum profit that bidder j is willing to gain from  
bundle S 
 NDj,S  need of bidder j at time t for bundle S  
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auction to participate. The decision problem is described as the following binary integer 
programming.  
maximize:   𝑉!𝐷!,!   𝑥!    !  (2) 
subject to:  𝑀𝑃!,!  𝑥! ≥ 𝑅𝑃!                ∀  𝑆 (3) 𝑉!𝑥!! ≤ 𝑁𝐷!,!                     (4) 𝑥! ∈ 0,1             ∀    𝑆     (5) 
In this mathematical programming, bidder j assigns a weight to each desirable bundle at each 
round. In order to maximize the volume while minimizing the distance to obtain the bundle, the 
bidder defines a weight as the volume of the bundle over the distance of the bundle to the 
bidder’s mill (equation 2). The first constraint (3) confirms that the bidder considers only the 
feasible bundles (the maximum price of the bidder is higher than the reserved price of the bundle). 
In order to avoid bidding on more items than needed, constraint (4) ensures that the sum of the 
selected bundles is less than the bidder’s need, which also considers a small buffer to account for 
lost bids. Equation (5) shows the binary constraint.  
The valuation function of the bidders’ bidding approach is described in equation (6), as suggested 
in Farnia et al. (2013). 
𝑣!,! = α 𝑀𝑃!,! − 𝑁𝑃!,!2 ∗ 𝑡𝑎𝑛ℎ 𝑓! 𝑦𝑓! 𝑑 ∗ 𝑓!! 𝑛𝑓!! 𝑐 − 2 + 𝛽 𝑀𝑃!,! + 𝑁𝑃!,!2 + 1 −   𝛽 𝑦!,!          (6) 
In this equation, 𝑣!,!  is the valuation function of bidder j for bundle S, 𝑓! 𝑦  is the total duration 
of the procurement process to achieve a target supply volume (i.e. a year), 𝑓! 𝑑  is the duration of 
the remaining time at any specific moment in the simulation to achieve that target. Next, 𝑓!! 𝑐  
and 𝑓!! 𝑛  are respectively the target supply volume of bidder j, and the remaining volume at any 
specific moment in the simulation to achieve the target supply volume. The first two elements of 
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equation (6) represent the adaptive part of the valuation function. The target supply volume of a 
bidder is a global target (for all species).   𝑦!,!   is the learning part of the adaptive learning behaviour. For example, if S consists of species 
s1 and s2, 𝑦!,! for these species is shown in equation (7). We estimate the coefficients of this 
equation using a regression on the history of the auction. More details can be found in Farnia et al 
(2013). At each round, the bidders consider the winning history and extract the information 
including the location of the winner and the winning price for each bundle. As each bundle is 
considered separately, there are less and less data available to compute equation 7. This may 
affect the capacity of the learning part to anticipate a valid bidding price. Eventually, when not 
enough data is available, the bidders estimate the bidding price of a bundle according to the price 
history of single species. 
More specifically, the bidders estimate the coefficients (𝛽!, 𝛽!, 𝛽!…) of the regression function 
at each round and for each bundle, adding the most recent information about the winning bids. 
Next, once the coefficients are estimated, and using the information of the current auction, the 
bidder anticipates the value 𝑦!,!!!! of the bundle, with 𝑥!,!! and  𝑥!,!! being the volume of s1 and 
the volume of s2 in bundle s1s2, respectively, using equation (7). Next, the offer of bidder 𝑣!,!!,!! 
is calculated with equation (6). 𝑦!,!!!! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐷!,!!!! + 𝛽!𝑥!,!! +   𝛽!𝑥!,!!                            (7) 
In Equation (6), α and 𝛽 are defined as coefficients that vary within the interval [0;1]. In this 
model the bidders randomly behave according to the different values of α and 𝛽. The valuation 
function is purely adaptive if α = 𝛽 = 1. When α = 𝛽 = 0, the valuation function is strictly based 
on learning.  
4.4.2 Winner determination 
This section describes the winner determination algorithm for the simulated combinatorial 
auction. As previously explained in Section 3, softwood mills are interested in softwoods (s1 and 
s2). According to their size and their supply needs, the mills are interested in s1, s2, s1s2, and 
s1s2h1h2 (i.e. whole forest stand) bundles. For example if the mill is smaller, it will make an 
offer for only s1 or s2, while a larger mill, or one needing more supplies, will also make an offer 
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for s1s2. Mills which do not wish to collaborate with others at the time of harvest, will also make 
an offer for s1s2h1h2. That way, if they win the bundle, they will control harvest operation 
planning. Similarly, hardwood mills make offers for h1, h2, h1h2, and s1s2h1h2 bundles. 
Entrepreneurs can also make offers for these bundles, as their mission is to sell timbers to all 
kinds of mills. The following algorithm shows the winner determination procedure that is 
triggered within the simulation to determine the solution of each auction.  
Let  
 
J be number of bidders; 
vj,s1 be bidder j’s value of s1; 
vj,s2 be bidder j’s value of s2; 
vj,h1 be bidder j’s value of h1; 
vj,h2 be bidder j’s value of h2; 
vj,s1s2 be bidder j’s value of s1s2; 
vj,h1h2 be bidder j’s value of h1h2; 
vj,s1s2h1h2 be bidder j’s value of s1s2h1h2; 
ws1 be the winner of s1; 
ws2 be the winner of s2; 
wh1 be the winner of h1; 
wh2 be the winner of h2; 
 
[ 
vs1=vs2=vh1=vh2=vs1s2=vh1h2=0 
 
for j=1 to J do 
vs1 = max (vs1, vj,s1) 
vs2 = max (vs2, vj,s2) 
vh1 = max (vh1, vj,h1) 
vh2 = max (vh2, vj,h2) 
vs1,s2 = max (vs1,s2, vj,s1,s2) 
vh1,h2 = max (vh1,h2, vj,h1,h2) 
vs1s2h1,h2 = max (vs1s2h1,h2 , vj,s1s2h1h2) 
end for 
 
If vs1 + vs2 > vs1s2 then  
    ws1 = j | vs1=vj,s1 and j ∈ [1,J] 
    ws2 = j | vs2=vj,s2 and j ∈ [1,J] 
    vs1s2 = vs1 + vs2  
else 
    ws1 = ws2 = j | vs1s2 = vj,s1s2 and j ∈ [1,J] 
end if 
 
If vh1 + vh2 > vh1h2 then  
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    wh1 = j | vh1=vj,h1 and j ∈ [1,J] 
    wh2 = j | vh2=vj,h2 and j ∈ [1,J] 
    vh1h2 = vh1 + vh2  
else 
    wh1 = wh2 = j | vh1h2 = vj,h1h2 and j ∈ [1,J] 
end if 
 
If vs1s2 + vh1h2 < vs1s2h1h2 then  
    ws1 = ws2 = wh1 = wh2 = j | vs1s2h1h2 = vj,s1s2h1h2 and j ∈ [1,J] 
end if 
] 
 
 
The outcome of this simple procedure selects ws1, ws2, wh1 and wh2, which are the winners of 
species s1, s2, h1, and h2 respectively. The winners of each species can be similar or different. 
This procedure only aims to identify the highest value of a fix and small number of combinations. 
In reality, the number of combinations can be much higher and required more advanced 
algorithms. 
4.5 Results and discussion 
Four experiments using the simulated model are presented in this section. We will first examine 
the outcomes of the simulation in terms of price per m3 for the seller and then in terms of target 
achievement for the bidders. In both cases we will first present the results for combinatorial 
auctions in various settings. They are then compared with those obtained with single-unit 
auctions.  
In this study, the first objective is to evaluate how combinatorial auctions can benefit the seller in 
different setup configurations (Experiment 1). Next, target achievement is analyzed in order to 
know how much the buyer can fulfill its needs through the combinatorial auction (Experiment 2). 
We then aim at comparing the revenue (i.e., price per m3) generated in both the combinatorial and 
single-unit auctions (Experiment 3). Finally, the fourth objective is the compare the ability of 
companies to achieve their target supply needs with both combinatorial and single-unit auctions 
(Experiment 4). 
62 
 
  
4.5.1 Experiment 1 – Price per m3 in combinatorial auctions 
This part of the experiments describes a sensitivity analysis of the impacts of several parameters 
on the price per m3 of the combinatorial auction. The parameters that can be changed in the 
model are the number of auctions per year, the auction periodicity, the lot size, and the number of 
bidders. In order to assess the impacts of these parameters on the revenue, three levels (low, 
medium and high) are defined for each parameter. The levels for the number of auctions per year 
are 100, 250, and 400. The periodicity levels are defined as 7, 15 and 30 days. The three lot sizes 
are 10,000 15,000 and 20,000 m3. Finally, the number of bidders is set to 100, 150, and 200. 
These values are inspired by actual data from timber auctions in Quebec. In this study, within each 
simulation, lot size is the same for all lots. Therefore, there is no possible scale economy to be 
gained from large lots. This limitation does not affect the general results, although it limits our 
ability to properly evaluate the impacts of simultaneous auctions with variable lot sizes.  
All 34 (81) configurations of these parameter levels were tested. For each configuration, the 
experiments are repeated 25 times for a total of 2,025 experiments. Table 4–2 shows the analysis 
of variance for the price per m3 resulting from the combinatorial auctions. In order to simplify the 
analysis, these studies only analyze the effects of each parameter and all combinations of any two 
independent variables. The ANOVA studies show a R2 above 0.80, which indicates a reasonable 
level of statistical certainty. The results show that the only significant parameters are the number 
of auctions, the lot size, the number of bidders, and the combination of number of auctions and 
lot size.  
Figure 4–1 shows the effects of each parameter. As it is shown, when the number of auctions 
increases, the price per m3 decreases due to more supply on the market. The price per m3 
diminishes when the lots get larger, again because of more supply. When number of bidders 
increases, the price per m3 goes up. 
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Table 4–2: Analysis of variance for price per3 from the combinatorial auctions 
Number of observations = 2025 R2 =0.800016 
Root MSE = 0.104238 Adjusted R2 =0.796803 
Source Partial SS MS F Prob > F 
Model 86.5861 2.70582 249.0248 <.0001 
Number of Auctions 0.327819 0.16391 15.0851 <.0001 
Periodicity 0.016152 0.008076 0.7432 0.4757 
Lot Size 0.168619 0.084309 7.7593 0.0004 
Number of Bidders 10.991764 5.495882 505.8035 <.0001 
Number of Auctions # 
Periodicity 0.021667 0.005417 0.4985 0.7369 
Number of Auctions # Lot Size 0.114439 0.02861 2.633 0.0327 
Number of Auctions # Number 
of Bidders 0.014781 0.003695 0.3401 0.851 
Periodicity # Lot Size 0.011365 0.002841 0.2615 0.9027 
Periodicity # Number of Bidders 0.046794 0.011698 1.0766 0.3664 
Lot Size # Number of Bidders 0.044701 0.011175 1.0285 0.3911 
Residual 21.64437 0.01087   
Total 108.23046    
 
 
   
a) b) c) 
Figure 4–1: Price per m3 from the combinatorial auctions; (a) impact of the number of auctions; 
(b) impact of the lot size; (c) impact of the number of bidders. 
Figure 4–2 describes how a pair of independent variables affects the outcome of the auction. In 
particular, this figure shows that when the number of auctions increases, the price per m3 
decreases, even if lot size changes, but the price is lower when lot size gets larger. The reason for 
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this result is that both number of auctions and lot size significantly increase supply. Therefore, the 
combination of these two parameters affects the price per m3. 
 
Figure 4–2: Comparative analysis of the price per m3 from the combinatorial auctions: combined 
effect of number of auctions and lot size 
4.5.2 Experiment 2 – Target achievement of bidders in combinatorial auctions 
Target achievement is a dependent variable that represents the ability of the bidders to achieve 
their target supply volume. This experiment investigates the impacts of a combinatorial auction 
on this variable. Again, we analyzed the effect of the same parameters (number of auctions, 
periodicity, lot size, and number of bidders) on the target achievement of the bidders. Table 4–3 
shows the analysis of variance of the parameters on the target achievement. As it is shown in this 
table, the parameters contribute to explaining more than 98% of the variance of the target 
achievement. All the analyzed parameters have a significant effect. 
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Table 4–3: Analysis of variance for the target achievement of bidders with combinatorial auctions 
Number of observations = 2025 R2 =0.984379 
Root MSE = 0.022816 Adjusted R2 =0.984128 
Source Partial SS DF MS F Prob > F 
Model 65.345546 32 2.04205 3922.827 <.0001 
Number of Auctions 6.8862696 2 3.443135 6614.349 <.0001 
Periodicity 0.0279949 2 0.013997 26.8894 <.0001 
Lot Size 1.0181216 2 0.509061 977.9187 <.0001 
Number of Bidders 0.053689 2 0.026844 51.5689 <.0001 
Number of Auctions # Periodicity 0.2343491 4 0.058587 112.5476 <.0001 
Number of Auctions # Lot Size 2.2101542 4 0.552539 1061.441 <.0001 
Number of Auctions # Number of 
Bidders 2.9138346 4 0.728459 1399.388 <.0001 
Periodicity # Lot Size 0.036632 4 0.009158 17.5927 <.0001 
Periodicity # Number of Bidders 0.0523244 4 0.013081 25.1291 <.0001 
Lot Size # Number of Bidders 0.8238443 4 0.205961 395.6564 <.0001 
Residual 1.036946 1992 0.00052   
Total 66.382493 2024    
 
To illustrate the analysis of variance, Figure 4–3 shows the effects of single parameters. Number 
of auctions and lot size show a positive impact, while periodicity and number of bidders have a 
negative impact on the target achievement. The reasons for the positive impact is that there is 
more timbers through the auction system, therefore, the bidders can win more wood supply to 
fulfill their needs. Similarly, when number of bidders rises, the auction becomes more 
competitive and the chance of winning drops. When periodicity is higher, there are more auctions 
at each round. Therefore, the bidders have more auctions to decide at each round. The bidders 
tend to bid only on the amount they need, since they think they may win; hence, they might loose 
some opportunities by not participating in other auctions. Therefore, it is probable that bidders 
win lower volumes when there are more auctions in one round.  
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a) b) 
  
c) d) 
Figure 4–3: analysis of the target achievement of bidders from combinatorial auctions: (a) effect 
of the number of auctions; (b) effect of periodicity; (c) effect of lot size; (d) effect of the number 
of bidders 
Figure 4–4 shows the comparative analysis of target achievement. As shown, any combination of 
two parameters has a significant effect on target achievement of combinatorial auction. 
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Figure 4–4: Comparative analysis of the target achievement of bidders from combinatorial 
auctions: combined effects of each two parameter. 
4.5.3 Experiment 3 – Price per m3 – comparison between combinatorial and single-unit 
auctions 
 In this section, we compare the combinatorial auction and the single-unit auction and analyse 
specifically the impact on revenue (i.e., price per m3) using different setup configurations. We 
define this impact as the gain of using combinatorial auctions expressed as a percentage of the 
average price per m3 of single unit auction ((price per m3 of combinatorial auction / price per m3 
of single unit auction - 1) * 100). In order to perform a sensitivity analysis, we again consider the 
number of auctions, periodicity, lot size, and the number of bidders. Figure 4–5 displays the 
impact of these parameters. 
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a) b) 
  
c) d) 
Figure 4–5: percentage change (combinatorial auction over single-unit auction) in price per m3 as 
a function of (a) the number of auctions (b) lot size (c) the number of bidders, and  (d) periodicity 
First, the gain increases as the number of auctions rises. In other words, the combinatorial auction 
is preferable to the single-unit auction as the number of auctions increases. Similarly, the 
combinatorial auction is preferable to single-unit auction, when there are fewer bidders. The 
results show that the difference between combinatorial auction and single-unit auction is higher, 
when the number of auctions and the number of bidders are in non-equivalent market situation. In 
other words, when there is a considerable difference between potential supply and potential 
demand, the difference between two auctions is higher. For example, when there are 250 auctions 
and 150 bidders in the market there is not considerable difference between the outcomes of two 
types of auctions. The comparative analysis of these parameters is detailed in experiment 4 along 
with comparative analysis of the effects of the parameters on target achievement. 
4.5.4 Experiment 4 – Target achievement of bidders – comparison between combinatorial 
and single-unit auctions  
The impact on the target achievement of bidders between combinatorial and single-unit auctions 
is measured as the target achievement increase from using combinatorial auction expressed as a 
percentage of the target achievement of single unit auction ((target achievement of combinatorial 
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auction / target achievement of single unit auction -1) * 100). Figure 4–6 presents the impact of 
each parameter on target achievement.  
  
a) b) 
  
c) d) 
Figure 4–6: percentage change (combinatorial auction over single-unit auction) in target 
achievement as a function of (a) the number of auctions (b) lot size (c) the number of bidders, and 
(d) periodicity 
The combinatorial auction is preferable to single-unit auction when the number of auctions is 
high and the number of bidders is low. Therefore, the combinatorial auction is better than single-
unit auction for bidders, when the market is less competitive. Similarly, bidders will prefer 
combinatorial auction when lot size is larger, or there are more items in the market.  
Figure 4–7 presents the comparative analysis of the impact on sale price and target achievement 
with any two combinations of auction design parameters (i.e., the number of bidders and the 
number of auctions, the number of bidders and lot size, the number of bidders and periodicity, the 
number of auctions and lot size, the number of auctions and periodicity, and lot size and 
periodicity). The results show that the impact on sale price increases when there are more 
auctions, while lots are large and there are fewer bidders. Figure 4–7 illustrates that the auctioneer 
can obtain higher price through combinatorial auction, when the market is less competitive (i.e., 
more demand and less supply). As it is shown, the combinatorial auction is better (in terms of 
-­‐5	  0	  
5	  10	  
15	  
100	   250	   400	   -­‐10	  -­‐5	  
0	  5	  
10	  15	  
20	  
10000	   15000	   20000	  
-­‐10	  -­‐5	  
0	  5	  
10	  15	  
20	  25	  
100	   150	   200	   0	  1	  
2	  3	  
4	  5	  
6	  
7	   15	   30	  
70 
 
  
both sale price and target achievement) in situations when there are more auctions, few rounds of 
auction (higher periodicity), lager lots, and fewer bidders.  
Comparing the comparative analysis of any two combinations of parameters between the sale 
price and the target achievement (e.g. figure 7(a) and figure 7(b)), it can easily be observed in 
Figure 7 that this correlation is positive, which tends to show that both objectives can be achieved 
simultaneously. For example, figure 7(a) and figure 7(b) present that combinatorial auction is 
preferable over single-unit auction when the combination of “the number of bidders” and “the 
number of auctions” are 100 and 250, 100 and 400, and 150 and 400 auctions per year.  
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a) b) 
  
c) d) 
  
e) f) 
Figure 4–7(part 1): Comparative analysis of the impacts on sale price and target achievement 
(Part 1). (a) Price per m3: combined effects of number of bidders and number of auctions. (b) 
Target achievement: combined effects of number of bidders and number of auctions. (c) Price per 
m3: combined effects of number of bidders and lot size. (d) Target achievement: combined 
effects of number of bidders and lot size. (e) Price per m3: combined effects of number of bidders 
and periodicity. (f) Target achievement: combined effects of number of bidders and periodicity. 
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a) b) 
  
c) d) 
  
e) f) 
 
Figure 4-7 (part 2): Comparative analysis of the impact on sale price and target achievement (Part 
2). (a) Price per m3: combined effects of number of auctions and lot size. (b) Target achievement: 
combined effects of number of auctions and lot size. (c) Price per m3: combined effects of 
number of auctions and periodicity. (d) Target achievement: combined effects of number of 
auctions and periodicity. (e) Price per m3: combined effects of lot size and periodicity. (f) Target 
achievement: combined effects of lot size and periodicity.   
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4.6 Conclusion and future studies 
This paper presents a study of a multiple-round timber combinatorial auction using a multi-agent 
simulation platform. The performance of the auction was experimented in various setup 
configurations, to confirm that the simulated model provides realistic outcomes. Two main 
indicators were proposed in order to measure the performance of the model. Sale price per m3 
evaluates the auctioneer capability to gain generate revenue from the auctions. Target 
achievement evaluates the bidder capability to fulfill their needs from auctions. We also analyzed 
the indicators for validating the performance of combinatorial auction, and the performance of the 
comparison of combinatorial auction with single-unit auction. 
Our results show that the design auction parameters that effect on the sale price of combinatorial 
auction are the number of auctions, the number of bidders and lot size. In combinatorial auction 
price per m3 is higher when the market is less competitive. The bidders’ target achievement also 
can be effected by the number of auctions, the number of bidders, periodicity, and lot size and 
combined effects of each two parameter. 
The sensitivity analysis of the auctions comparisons also illustrates that the combinatorial auction 
is preferable over single-unit auction in less competitive situations. The reason is that in 
combinatorial auction when there are more auctions and fewer bidders, the bidders can bid on 
variety of bundles of the species, which are related to their needs, without bidding on the species 
that they don't need. In other words, in combinatorial auction the bidders can fulfill their needs 
with a combination of auctions, while in single unit auction they must bid on fewer auctions and 
win species that they don't necessarily need. 
Both objectives of timer auction (sale price and target achievement) can be achieved 
simultaneously following the results of the comparative analysis of any two combinations of 
parameters. That means the combinatorial auction is better than single unit auction in terms of 
both objectives when there are more auctions, few rounds of auction (higher periodicity), larger 
lots, and fewer bidders. 
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CHAPTER 5 : ARTICLE 3 : TIME-BASED COMBINATORIAL 
AUCTION FOR TIMBER ALLOCATION AND DELIVERY 
COORDINATION 
Abstract: 
The timber auction system currently used in the province of Québec, Canada, is a single unit 
auction, in which timber users bid on entire forest stands located within a specific area. In this 
procurement system, timber users (i.e., winners) are responsible for harvesting the entire stands 
and for reselling undesirable timber species to others. In order to improve the limits of this 
system, this paper proposes a sustainable auction system, referred to as time-based timber 
combinatorial auction. In this approach, time is not part of the definition of the goods for sale. It 
is used to valuate the good for sale with respect to their expected delivery period. Therefore, this 
system aims to simultaneously allocate multiple goods, or products in mixed forest stand, to 
multiple winners, and address the coordination of timber deliveries to their winners. The 
proposed timber combinatorial auction provides an open access allocation of timber, based on its 
intrinsic economic value, while allowing the Ministry of natural resources to exercise high 
standard for environmentally friendly forest operations. From a logistic point of view, a sensitive 
analysis is conducted in order to compare the proposed time-based combinatorial auction with a 
combinatorial auction with no delivery coordination. Both models are compared according to 
bidders’ and seller’s time flexibility. Experimental results illustrate the impact (i.e., cost) of 
delivery coordination on total revenue due to loss of value when time preference is not fully 
satisfied. This cost evaluation can then be used as an upper bound of the cost of coordination, 
when delivery coordination must be manually negotiated among multi-stakeholder. 
Keywords: combinatorial auction, timber auction, coordination, wood freshness, winner 
determination problem. 
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5.1 Introduction 
Former Québec forest regime, which was based on an exclusive long-term licencing system, was 
unable to establish a fair price for timber transactions, and therefore a sustainable economic 
system. Consequently, under the pressure of international trade agreements, the Québec 
government, along with other provinces in Canada (Niquidet and van Kooten, 2006), decided to 
make a portion of the annual timber supply (25%) available to anyone through an auction system. 
With timber available through auctions, buyers can access a larger timber supply according to the 
value of their own forest products market. In such a context, designing an efficient auction system 
while preserving a certain level of guaranteed supplies for Québec companies can become a 
complex task. Different goals are pursued such as offering a certain level of stability to traditional 
users, offering opportunities to new entrepreneurs and assuring a fair financial return for the 
public asset. In order to do that, the government currently uses an auction system in which entire 
forest stands are sold to a single winner. The advantage of this type of auction is that it is rather 
simple to implement. Bidders can assess the volume of each species available in each stand for 
sale and evaluate their worth, whether the stumpage sale is lump-sum sale (i.e., one price for the 
entire stand) or a scale sale (i.e., a unit price -per foot, board measure (fbm), cord, post, etc.- for 
each species of extracted wood). Furthermore, the seller is not involved in a complex winner 
determination problem.  
Timber procurement planning in public land and in a multi-firm setting involves many issues that 
must be considered simultaneously. First, the sharing of the available volumes among forest 
companies must consider the specific needs of each forest companies, the scheduling and 
coordination of harvest and delivery activities, wood freshness, as well as the transaction prices 
for procurement services. When an auction process is introduced in such a context, as it is being 
introduced in the province of Québec, timber procurement becomes more complicated, which, in 
turn, forces forest companies to adapt to the new procurement environment. 
In the context of public land, timber procurement planning is generally a multi-firm decision 
problem, which requires the coordination of several companies. Coordination is defined as the 
management of interdependencies among distinct activities (Malone and Crowston, 1994). In the 
context of supply chain management, because companies are self-interested, the coordination of 
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their activities with others is essential to improve supply chain efficiency. In the context of timber 
procurement in public land, such coordination involves several aspects to address, including (1) 
input-output coordination in time (i.e., what and when), since the forest companies that are 
responsible for forest operations, harvest entire mixed forest area and deliver uninteresting 
species/qualities to other companies; (2) quantity availability (i.e., how much), which is a global 
constraint for all potential timber user; (3) self-interested forest companies (i.e., simultaneous 
competition and cooperation), which implies that they are responsible for managing their own 
procurement process, for competing with others, as well as for cooperating with others to 
coordinate their operations.  
In a multi-firm context, timber procurement planners face several challenges. As mentioned 
above, one of these challenges is associated with the coordination of the distribution of volumes 
among buyers. The allocation agreement between them should consequently consider the 
transaction prices (i.e., stumpage sale prices), the timing of the procurement activities, and the 
wood freshness. Therefore, the coordination of forest operations and the scheduling of deliveries 
are crucial activities, because timber deterioration and wood freshness influence timber value. In 
other words, timber procurement planners must coordinate their operations with other companies, 
which are also involved in planning their own procurement and for meeting their own objectives.  
Timber procurement planning and coordination involves a multitude of internal and external 
factors. In a mixed forest public land environment, forest companies may supply each other 
through their forest operations. In order to address part of this problem, Beaudoin et al. (2010) 
propose a timber procurement planning model in a two-firm environment based on a negotiation 
process. However, in the context of n forest companies (n>2), the coordination problem is more 
challenging and the negotiation process is more complicated. When many potential buyers are 
involved, auction is an efficient and practical process to allocate goods to buyers according to 
market value. It has therefore been used for centuries (Marty and Préget, 2010), and generally in 
its simplest form (i.e., first-price sealed-bid auction, Brown, 2012), for the allocation of pure or 
mixed species forest stands to forest product companies. Although such market mechanisms, 
when used in conjunction with government control mechanisms, are instrumental to the creation 
of a sustainable forest management approach (Kant, 2010), these rather simple applications of the 
single unit first-price auction cannot directly address the multi-firm coordination problem of 
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forest operations. In Québec, this coordination problem is left to forest companies, which are 
ultimately responsible for managing their own forest operations within a specific period of time 
(from months to years) and for reselling undesirable species/qualities to other companies or users. 
Because mixed species forest stands can be considered as not just one but several goods for sale 
(i.e., combinations of species/quality), combinatorial timber auction can solve simultaneously the 
allocation of available wood to potential users and the coordination of harvest and delivery 
operations.  
In combinatorial auctions, a variety of different goods are available in the market. Combinatorial 
auctions are particularly appropriate when bidders’ valuation process depends on the set of goods 
they wish to purchase. In this paper, we propose a novel application of the combinatorial auction 
in order to simultaneously allocate the available volumes of mixed species stands to multiple 
users, and to coordinate timber deliveries and, indirectly, forest operations. To achieve these 
goals, the proposed combinatorial auction model first allows bidders to bid not only on entire 
stands (as in traditional first-price auction systems), but also on any combination of 
species/quality present in these stands. This type of auction helps bidders to directly meet their 
needs by bidding on the portions of the stands that matches their requirements. This auction 
system would also stop "bid skewing" behaviours, as described by Athey and Levin (2001), that 
occurs when bidders take advantage of estimation error of volume availability (made by the 
seller) in order to create winning bids that generate lower post-harvest cost. 
Next, the proposed combinatorial auction system allows bidders to express different values for 
these combinations of species/quality according to their delivery period. In other words, timber is 
sold delivered to the mill, which requires the seller to coordinate in time the deliveries of multiple 
species/quality combinations to multiple buyers. This paper thus proposes a novel Winner 
Determination Problem (WDP) model capable of simultaneously allocating timber to mills and 
coordinating their deliveries to multiple buyers. This auction model is more complicated to 
implement and operate for both the auctioneer and the buyers. However, it is also interesting for 
smaller forest product companies that want to participate in the auction, but have little bargaining 
power to coordinate the delivery of their portion of the stand with larger companies. This may, in 
turn, encourage participation in the auction. 
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the theoretical background of the related 
auction model. The time-based combinatorial auction model is introduced in Section 3. In Section 
4, the winner determination problem model of the proposed auction system is discussed along 
with its solution limitations. The experiments including the comparison of time-based 
combinatorial auction and regular combinatorial auction are presented in Section 5. Section 6 
presents and analyzes the results of the comparison of the two auction models, including the 
sensitive analysis of different factors. Finally, Section 7 concludes and discusses the limitation of 
the time-based combinatorial auction. 
5.2 Theoretical background 
Allocating and valuing natural resources such as timber stumpage, oil, mineral rights, and 
bandwidth spectrum are fundamental problems in the modern economy. Many types of auction 
models have been used to solve timber allocation problems and to ensure an accurate market 
price (Mead (1967), Hansen (1985), Paarsch (1991), Elyakime et al. (1994, 1997), Baldwin et al. 
(1997), Haile (2001), Athey et al. (2011)). Farnia et al. (2013) simulated and designed an 
approach for multiple-round timber Auction. Different bidding strategies were simulated and 
compared in various auction setup configurations. The authors suggest specific parameter 
configurations in order to maximize the seller’s revenue, including the number of auctions per 
year, the lot size, as well as the auction periodicity. However, like the auction model used in 
practice, these contributions generally consider single unit (i.e., entire forest stand) auctions for 
timber allocation, rather than combinatorial auctions, in which each species of a single forest 
stand can be sold separately.  
In a combinatorial auction, as described by Cramton et al. (2006), several items are for sale, and 
bidders can make offers on any sub-set of these items. The winners are the combination of offers 
that maximize the combined value of these offers. In order to solve these problems, Sakurai et al., 
(2000) present an algorithm to determine the winners in complex auction setups, such as Internet 
auction. Bai and Zhang, (2005) consider the reserve price in the context of multi-unit 
combinatorial auction and presented a new algorithm to solve the WDP. Some researchers 
consider other attributes as well and propose a solution to combine these attributes with existing 
WDP models (Cantillon and Pesendorfer, 2007). 
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In the basic combinatorial auction models, the items for sale are single units that can only be sold 
entirely. However, items can also be multiple indistinguishable units, which can be sold to 
multiple bidders. This auction model is referred to as the multi-unit combinatorial auction 
(MUCA). Similarly, Rabotyagov et al. (2013) present a multi-unit market mechanism for forest 
services. The results showed that fewer bids are more likely to result in higher sale price.  
Resource allocation in time and scheduling problems are another type of applications of 
combinatorial auctions. Several studies have been conducted on this topic in the literature. For 
instance, Rassenti et al. (1982) proposed a combinatorial auction approach to allocate airport 
landing time slots to competing airlines. Along the same line, Ghassemi Tari and Alaei (2013) 
proposed a combinatorial auction system for allocating and scheduling TV commercials. 
Similarly, Wang and Dargahi (2013) propose another approach of combinatorial auction 
application to constrained manufacturing capacity allocation in the context of mass customization.  
Combinatorial auctions are also used in many decentralized and agent-based scheduling problems 
(De Vries and Vohra, 2003; Cramton et al., 2006; Brewer, 1999). Wellman et al. (2001) 
developed a distributed bidding protocol based on combinatorial and ascending auctions to 
propose a solution to a complex scheduling problem. Similarly, Jung and Kim (2006) 
investigated the load-scheduling problem of several cranes in maritime container terminals. In the 
same vein, Lau et al. (2007) proposed a multi-period combinatorial auction for solving a large-
scale scheduling problem, in which each agent offers a determined list of jobs. Wang et al. (2009) 
present a formulation of the WDP in the context of an auction-based scheduling problem, in 
which time is not discretized. Instead, bids for the processing of a set of jobs are formalized using 
a requirement-based bidding language, which allow software agents to model specific scheduling 
constraints. A depth-first branch and bound search is used to solve the WDP. Similarly, 
Kutanglui and Wu (2001) provide an autonomous distributed scheduling system based 
combinatorial auction. Other applications propose iterative combinatorial auction mechanisms in 
the context of agent-based scheduling. Iterative combinatorial mechanism is used when bidders 
cannot decide on their valuations (Parkes and Ungar, 2000; Parkes, 2001), which is not the case 
in this paper. In these contributions, time is generally directly part of the definition of some 
constraints in the winner determination problem, if not directly part of the good for sale definition. 
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The next section compares more specifically time modeling in some of these contributions and 
the approach presented in this paper. 
There are also other auction models, beside combinatorial auctions, which consider multiple 
attributes (Bichler, et al., 1999; Suyama and Yokoo, 2005) and scoring functions (Müller, et al., 
2007; Asker and Cantillon, 2008). For example, Müller, et al. (2007) compared combinatorial 
scoring auctions with combinatorial price-only auctions (i.e., regular combinatorial auction). 
These kinds of auctions also measure quality in addition to the bidders’ valuations. In these types 
of auction, the seller calculates the final valuation of the products regardless of the initial 
valuations of participants. In other words, the calculation of the bids depends on the scores that 
are measured by the use of a rule or function. These scores are not necessarily equal to bidders’ 
valuations. In this paper, although the auctioneer does not use scoring rules, bidders are allowed 
to express several valuations of any sub-set of items based on the delivery period. 
5.3 Time-based combinatorial auction 
This section presents an extension of the classical combinatorial auction model, which aims at 
simultaneously allocating each individual timber product in a mix species forest stand, and 
coordinating harvest operations with the winning bidders preferences. The characteristics of the 
model are explained, including the general model description, the bid structure, as well as the 
winner determination problem formulation. 
5.3.1 Auction system description 
The proposed auction model is a seal-bid combinatorial auction. It is an extension of the auction 
model used by the Bureau de mise en marché des bois of the Québec government, which only 
sells entire forest stands of various sizes. In this model, we make a number of assumptions.  
First, the forest stands for sale are mixed, which implies that they contain different species and 
quality of timber. This assumption is particularly true in Canadian natural boreal forest. Second, 
there are several kinds of bidders. It assumed that bidders could be loggers and entrepreneurs, 
who do not directly transform timber as they only harvest and resale timber to different customers. 
Bidders can also be small or large forest product companies from different sectors (e.g., sawing, 
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pulp and paper, cabinet, wood floor, furniture, engineered wood product) that transform timber of 
various types into different products.  
The practical consequence of such a diverse market is that each bidder may be interested in only 
part of a stand instead of the entire stand. Our combinatorial model therefore allows bidders to 
bid not only on entire forest stands, but also on any subset of products (i.e., mix of species and 
quality) of these stands. Consequently, because each product is sold individually, a combinatorial 
auction model allows the auctioneer to allocate separately each product in order to maximize 
revenue. However, bidders cannot bid on part of a product (i.e., a portion of the available volume 
of a product). Their bids must cover all or nothing of the products available for sale in the stand. 
For instance, a bidder may want to make an offer for all the available volume of all quality levels 
of a specific species. In practice, this is not a problem for bidders as volumes available are 
smaller than their transformation capacity. Furthermore, logs can be stored for a while, before 
they deteriorate. Consequently, the implementation of such an auction model could lead to many 
winners with complementary bids in each stand for sale.  
This straightforward application of combinatorial auction already allows the auctioneer to gain 
control of all aspects of the sales (i.e., timber allocation). Indeed, in the auction model currently 
used in Québec, timber in mixed stands is allocated to winners through lump-sum sales of the 
entire volume of all the products available in the stand. Winners hence control the resale of 
undesirable products to other companies or users. In the combinatorial auction, however, the 
complete control of the sales also comes with the responsibility for managing forest operations 
and the delivery of each product to their winner. This could eventually lead to timber 
deterioration problems if stands are harvested too early with respect to their delivery date. 
Consequently, the auctioneer must guarantee an acceptable level of freshness and manage harvest 
and delivery operations so as to ensure that freshness meets expected level. 
In order to address this issue, our timber combinatorial auction model proposes to further sub-
divide the notion of combinations of product in order to add the notion of delivery time 
preference. In other words, bidders simultaneously bid on both combinations of products and 
preferred (i.e., latest) delivery period. This implies that, for any bidder, each possible combination 
of products can be valued differently according to the preferred delivery period. This model is 
referred to as a time-based combinatorial auction model.  
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As mentioned above, time dependent combinatorial auction is not new. However, time in the 
present problem does not have the same conceptual meaning as in other combinatorial auction 
applications of scheduling and resources allocation in time. For instance, in the application of 
combinatorial auction to allocate airport landing time slots of Rassenti et al. (1982), time 
compatibility is managed directly with distinct slot definitions (i.e, good for sale) and bid 
contingency rules. In other words, as illustrated in Figure 5–1, all time slots are distinct goods, 
defined as time period usage of specific resources that are sold separately. This is not the case in 
our problem because the available timber is sold once. In other words, in our problem, time is 
only a dimension of good valuation as timber deteriorates with time. Time is therefore a 
characteristic of the transaction, not an attribute of the good for sale (or the good itself), as 
presented in Figure 5–1. In Figure 5–1, the seller does not allow the bidder to offer a value for a 
good for every period of time, while in Figure 5–2, the bidders can make an offer for each good 
and each period of time. 
 
Figure 5–1. Time-based good and bid definition 
The application of combinatorial auction for the allocation and scheduling of TV commercials of 
Ghassemi Tari and Alaei (2013) modeled the time for each specific commercial break as a bulk 
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product for sale. Only the upper bound of the available amount of time is thus a relevant 
constraint for the auctioneer. This is conceptually equivalent to the multi-unit auction introduced 
earlier. Once again, this is not the case in the timber allocation problem because time is not the 
product for sale. In the timber allocation problem, the combination of winning offers must satisfy 
a time constraint within which all products must be delivered in order to achieve a certain level of 
freshness. Indeed, in existing timber auction models, such as single unit and combinatorial 
auctions, there are unaddressed issues concerning timber freshness. For example, in single unit 
auction, because the entire lot is assigned to one bidder, the bidder must sell (in the context of 
mixed forest lots) the species/qualities he does not want. Because this may take time, the wood 
may not be fresh and may lose its quality at the time of processing. Similarly, in combinatorial 
auction, after winners have been announced, they must somehow agree on the specific time of 
harvesting of the lot. However, they may not need the items at the same time, and some of them 
may wish to keep their share in inventory until they need them. This coordination issue may also 
affect quality as harvested timber losses its freshness as time passes.  
In the proposed model, because bidders announce their time preference with respect to timber 
delivery, the winner determination problem can directly tackle this coordination issue, and 
shorten the time between mixed species stand harvesting and timber processing in the mill. 
Therefore, although bidders may behave irrationally, they must address the need to express their 
delivery time preferences in the proposed bid structure. The next section describes the proposed 
bid structure. 
5.3.2 Bids structure 
Bids are structured as sets of triplets (product combination; period; value), as exemplified in 
Figure 5–2 and Figure 5–3. In other words, each bid represents a set of valuation for each 
possible combination of products and delivery period (many of them being possibly void). In this 
example in Figure 5–2, the bidder valuation of products 𝐴 ∪ 𝐵 is, respectively, 7, 8 and 6 for 
period 1,2 and 3. This bid also expresses the willingness of the bidder to buy only 𝐴 for a value of 
3 and a delivery in period 3, and product 𝐵 for a value of 4 and a delivery in period 1. Among the 
5 distinct offers contained in this bid, only one can win the auction. Therefore the bidder totally 
present five distinct offers which includes three offers for products 𝐴 ∪ 𝐵 in different periods, 
one offer for product A at period 3, and one offer for product B at period 1. These offers can be 
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seen at the matrix in Figure 5–3 as non-zero elements. In this bid structure, note that the proposed 
timber values include all harvest and delivery costs. 
 
Figure 5–2: Time-dependant valuation of goods 
      
Figure 5–3: Bid structure 
Although this bid structure is more complex to manage for potential buyers, its complexity 
mainly depends upon the time granularity imposed by the auctioneer. Because this auction 
process is linked to the annual procurement planning of forest product companies (see Beaudoin 
et al., 2007, for a description of this planning problem), it is however unnecessary to have a time-
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granularity that is smaller than a month. Consequently, because forest product manufacturing 
plants require specific mix of species and quality, forest engineers and procurement planners only 
need to focus on the valuation of these combinations with respect to the delivery period. 
Furthermore, because the Québec timber licencing system requires licensees to send annual 
procurement plan to the Québec government, it is natural for licensed forest product companies 
(which potentially represent most bidders) to use a similar time discretization in the auction 
system, for the purpose of integrating both business processes.  
The auctioneer also has the option to use larger time periods, such as the season (3-month period 
length). This option allows the auctioneer greater time flexibility to plan for harvest and delivery 
operations, and potentially increase revenue but it is less accurate for buying companies, which 
are used to monthly plans. This time sensitivity is specifically studied in the experiments section. 
Finally, because products are sold separately, the auctioneer (i.e., the Ministry of natural 
resources) has the opportunity to control specific aspects of the auction to improve fairness. For 
instance, large forest product companies are generally interested in a few products. During a 
combinatorial auction of several products from the same area, these large companies might make 
a global offer to make sure they obtain the products they need, while controlling both the delivery 
and the resale of the uninteresting products (which is also true for a simple auction). This type of 
behaviour would limit the ability of smaller timber users to take part in the auction, which would 
then be dominated by larger companies. Limiting the capacity to make offers only to specific 
products according to the need of the plants would therefore allow smaller timber users to 
participate in the auction and have a better control over timber deliveries. The next section 
describes the corresponding winner determination problem model (i.e., WDP). 
5.4 Winner Determination Problem 
The process of finding the winners in single unit auctions is straightforward. When the auction is 
combinatorial, however, a mathematical model must be designed and solved in order to find the 
combination of offers that maximizes revenue. As mentioned earlier, determining the winners in 
timber combinatorial auction requires addressing the problem of timber deterioration in time. 
Because wood tends to deteriorate (e.g., discoloration, decay) once trees are felled, it is necessary 
to deliver and process them within a reasonable amount of time, before it deteriorates. In this 
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paper, the period length during which all deliveries must be made is referred to the delivery 
horizon. Therefore, the design of the winner determination problem must address specifically this 
type of constraints. 
In general, the modeling of a winner determination problem depends directly on the auction 
design, the configuration of the products for sale, as well as on other specific constraints. Because 
our auction system has a time dependent bid structure, the WDP must include specific constraints 
to tackle the coordination of deliveries as well as the management of timber deterioration. The 
next section introduces the proposed mathematical model. 
5.4.1 Mathematical model: 
The mathematical model presented below is an extension of the WDP for regular combinatorial 
auctions (Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2009). We first present the definition of indexes, sets, 
parameters, and variables. Then, the objective function and the constraints are presented. 
Indexes and sets: 
𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 set of bidders  𝑗 ∈ 𝐺    set of products 𝑆 ⊆ 𝐺 set of bundles of products (power set of products) 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇	   set of time periods 𝑑𝑡 ∈ 𝑇  set of dates of time periods 
Parameters:  
𝑉! 𝑠, 𝑡  bidder i’s valuation of bundle s at time t  𝑄(𝑠) volume of bundle s  𝑄(𝑗) volume of products j 𝐾  length of the delivery horizon (maximum allowable 
duration between all winning deliveries) 
Variables:  
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𝑥!,!,! Boolean variables, indicating whether bundle s is 
allocated to bidder i at time t 
Objective function:  
Maximize 
𝑉! 𝑠, 𝑡 𝑥!,!,!!∈!!∈!!∈! ± 𝜀 𝑄(𝑗)!     𝑥!,!,! (1) 
s.t.  
𝑥!,!,!!∈!!∈!!∈!! ≤ 1          ∀  𝑗 ∈ 𝐺     (2) 𝑥!,!,!!∈!!⊆! ≤ 1        ∀  𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 (3) (2 ∗ 𝑑𝑡! − 𝐾)𝑥!,!!,!!!∈! + (𝑑𝑡! − 𝑑𝑡!)𝑥!,!!,!!!∈!       ≤ 2 ∗ 𝑑𝑡!    ∀  (𝑖!, 𝑡!), (𝑖!, 𝑡!)	   (4) 𝑥!,!,! ∈ 0,1             ∀      𝑠 ∈ 𝑆, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇        	   (5) 
In this integer programming formulation, the objective function (Equation 1) states that the seller 
aims to maximize the sum of the agents’ announced valuations of the combination of products 
and time period (i.e., maximize revenue). The 𝜀 term is introduced in order to avoid multiple 
solutions for winning determination problem. Therefore, by adding 𝜀 and multiplying it by the 
volume, the solution of the winner determination problem is a bundle that maximizes both value 
and the sold volume.  
Equation (2) states that bidders cannot win bundles of products that have similar products in 
common (i.e., no overlapping bundles are allocated to the winners). Equation (3) states that no 
bidder can take more than one bundle at any given valuation (i.e., one bundle at a given time 
period). Next, Equation (4) deals with time management and prevents delivery preferences of 
winners to be spread over more than K time periods, which is the length of the delivery horizon. 
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This constraint is explained in the next section. Finally, Equation (5) ensures that all winners 
receive a complete subset of products, not a portion of these subsets. 
5.4.2 Timber freshness and delivery coordination 
As mentioned in the previous section, Equation (4) deals with delivery coordination and timber 
freshness at the same time. This constraint specifically limits the period of time during which 
timber delivery to winners can occur. To do so, we define K as the maximum allowed duration 
(i.e., defined as a number of time period) during which all timber transportation to winners can be 
planned. The larger this duration, the more flexibility the auctioneer has to plan deliveries, and 
consequently to plan harvest operations. Figure 5–4 presents an example of how time is managed. 
In this example, we assume that all bundles are mutually distinct and any combination of them 
can be sold. In the bid received, 5 offers (numbered 1 to 5) are represented in the figure. These 
offers are made for specific delivery during periods 1, 3, 5, 7 and 9 respectively. In this example, 
the length of the delivery horizon is 5 periods. Consequently, there are only 3 combinations of 
offers during which delivery can be made within 5 periods: ({offer #1; offer #2; offer #3}; total 
value=31), ({offer #2; offer #3; offer #4}; total value=32) and ({offer #3; offer #4; offer #5}; 
total value=28). Consequently, the winning combination of offers is the second one, with a total 
value of 32. 
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Figure 5–4. Time management example 
The length of the delivery horizon can be managed according to the auctioneer’s level of 
flexibility. The smaller the length of the delivery horizon, the fresher is the timber; however, in 
this case the auctioneer has less flexibility, which can lead to smaller revenue, as studied in the 
next section. In contrast, the larger the length of the delivery horizon, the more flexibility the 
auctioneer has to coordinate harvest operations and deliveries. On the other hand, the longer the 
delivery horizon, the bigger is the risk of timber deterioration. 
Granted in practice there is not a large amount of bids that must be processed by the auctioneer 
(i.e., the duration of the WDP computation is not an issue), the only unknown factor in this 
winner determination problem, as mentioned earlier, is the effect of the length the delivery 
horizon on revenue. In the next section, we therefore propose a series of experiments to 
specifically analyze this aspect. 
5.5 Methodology of experiments 
In order to evaluate the performance gap between the proposed time-based combinatorial auction 
and the combinatorial auction without time-management (in this case, we assume that the seller 
must manage, in conjunction with the winners, the coordination of harvest operations and 
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delivery after the auction), we designed a series of experiments, which is described hereafter. 
5.5.1 Bidders’ behaviour  
In order to simulate different auctions with a diverse population of bidders, which characteristics 
are similar in both types of auctions, we first introduce a typical bidder behavior that is defined in 
terms of time preference and time flexibility, followed by the time dependent valuation function 
used for the experiments. 
Time preference and flexibility 
A bidder’s time preference reflects the month (i.e., time period) during which he or she wants to 
receive the timber. In addition, a bidder’s time flexibility represents how much he or she is 
flexible with respect to its delivery time preference. For instance, some bidders may be willing to 
receive their timber at specific periods of time (e.g., April or May), while others may not have 
very specific time preferences (i.e., any month of the year).  
Time valuation function 
According to the concepts of time preference and flexibility introduced previously, the time 
valuation function is defined by equation (6). This function is based on a normal distribution 
function, where 𝜇 represents the bidders’ time preference and 𝜎! , or variance, presents the 
bidders’ time flexibility. MAXV is the maximum value that the bidder is willing to pay at its 
preferred time. 
𝑇𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑡 = 𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑉 ∗ 𝑒!(!!!)!!!!  (6) 
Figure 5–5 presents different examples of time valuation functions for a time preference at month 
6 (i.e., 𝜇 = 6) and three time flexibilities (i.e., 𝜎!=1.5,  4  and  7). In this example, the value of 
MAXV is 100. Consequently, the value of the time valuation function equals 100 at time t = 𝜇= 6 
for three instances of 𝜎!.  
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Figure 5–5. Examples of different time value function 
 
As shown in Figure 5–5, for 𝜎!  = 7, the bidder is the most flexible because its valuations of 
month 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 are almost similar. In other words, this means that this particular bidder's 
delivery time window is 5-months long, with only a slight loss in value at the beginning and the 
end of that window. For 𝜎!  = 4, the bidder has a smaller preferred delivery time window of 
months 5, 6 and 7. Indeed for months 4 and 8, the loss in value is much larger than the previous 
bidder's profile. This preference is even smaller for 𝜎!  = 1.5 which corresponds to a delivery time 
window of basically month 6, with a very large loss in value for the other time periods. 
Consequently, with a random generation of 𝜎!  and  𝜇, it is possible to control the generation of 
very different types of populations of bidders whose preferences can vary greatly. 
5.6 Experiments 
In the proposed experiments, the seller wants to sell the content of one forest stand, which 
contains 4 different products that can be sold either as separate items, or as any combination of 
products. For each individual experiment, 10 bidders were used. Bidders are randomly created 
with different time preferences, while bidders’ time flexibility is controlled for comparison 
purpose. Note that situations with less than 10 bidders were not studied here. It is possible 
however, in the case of a low number of bidders, to have no solution for a given level of 
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flexibility (i.e., K). In such situations, we simply assume that the auctioneer can increase K 
incrementally, until a solution is found. In the extreme case of incompatible bidders’ time 
preferences, the auctioneer can set K to 11 and the model will automatically find a solution, 
because it is equivalent to the basic combinatorial model. Furthermore, this particular issue is 
currently part of an agent-based simulation study that deals with the practical and dynamic 
implementation of this time-based combinatorial auction model. 
Furthermore, the general time horizon is 12 periods of one month during which product delivery 
can be planned. Along the same line, the seller’s time flexibility is controlled by the value of K. 
Several values of K and 𝜎! were also tested. Sets (7) to (10) present the values of 𝐾, 𝜇, 𝜎!, and T 
that were used in the experiments.  
𝐾 = 0, 1, 2… 11  (7) 𝜇 = 1, 2, 3…   12  (8) 𝜎! = 1.5, 4,7 	   (9) 𝑇 = 1, 2, 3… 12  (10) 
In order to generate several instances of data to be tested and compared with respect to the two 
auction models, four products were defined with random volumes, standard valuations, and 
reserve prices. All combinations of these products were also created. To do so, the volume, 
standard valuation and reserve price of each combination was calculated based on the sum of the 
volumes, standard valuations and reserve prices of the products specifically included in the 
combination. Then, 10 bidders were created for each instance. The maximum value that a bidder 
is willing to pay (i.e., MAXV) was randomly calculated based on the standard valuation of the 
combination, for each bidder and each combination. For each bidder, 𝜇 is created randomly. For 
each series of experiments, and as mentioned earlier, 𝜎! is the same for all bidders, since these 
experiments aim at evaluating the effect of 𝜎! on revenue. Also all values of K between 0 and 11 
were systematically tested. Finally, for the time-based combinatorial auction, the specific 
valuation of each bidder, each combination and each period were calculated using Equation (6). 
For comparison purposes, in the combinatorial auction with no time management, the valuation 
of each combination of products was set to the value MAXV. In order to improve the significance 
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level of our results, each set of experiments was repeated 30 times, for a total of 1080 
optimization results.  
5.7 Results and discussion 
Using the sets of data defined in the previous section, the model was tested with CPLEX. The 
average computation time was 3 minutes and 20 seconds. The performance gap between the time-
based combinatorial auction and the combinatorial auction with no time management are shown 
in Figure 5–6.  
 
Figure 5–6. Average loss of revenue (in percent of average revenue of combinatorial 
auction without time management) 
As expected, the time-based combinatorial auction leads systematically to a slight loss of revenue, 
due to the decreasing valuation function used to calculate the offers' value. This loss of revenue 
represents the maximum value the seller can invest in the coordination of harvest and delivery 
operations after the auction, in conjunction with the winners. In other words, if the value of this 
loss of revenue is higher than the cost of managing the coordination of deliveries, then the simple 
combinatorial auction with no time management is better for the seller. This cost can vary greatly 
according the number of winners and their willingness to find a compromise. 
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Furthermore, in practice, the value of a forest stand is directly proportional to the volume of 
timber available. On the one hand, one can expect this loss of revenue to be higher for a larger 
stand. On the other hand, forest product companies might be more flexible with delivery time as 
forest stands for sale get larger, because they represent a more significant portion of the supply. 
Furthermore, although the seller might experience a larger loss of revenue for larger forest stands, 
he can also expect scale economies with respect to harvest operations. This loss of revenue must 
therefore be compared to actual coordination cost and to the impact of scale economies with 
harvest operations. 
Similarly, this loss of revenue is also a function of bidders' time flexibility as presented in 
Equation (6). This aspect is specifically shown in Figure 5–6. The first observation is that as K 
increases, the loss of revenue decreases as well, which is perfectly normal (when K = 11, time is 
basically ignored, which is equivalent to the combinatorial auction with no time management). 
When K = 0, in other words when all products are delivered during the same preferred time 
period, then the average loss of revenue is between 0.5% and 3%, according to the bidders' time 
flexibility. 
The second observation is that when bidders' flexibility is low (i.e., high drop of value when 
moving away from the preferred period), in other words when 𝜎! is small, then the loss of 
revenue increases up to 3% on average. On the contrary, when bidders have no time preference, 
then the time-based combinatorial auction is, again, equivalent to the combinatorial auction with 
no time management). 
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Figure 5–7. Revenue for time-based combinatorial auction (TBCA) for different Ks and 
Variances 
 
Figure 5–7 shows the revenue generated from time-based combinatorial auction. These results 
show that when the bidders have more flexibility (i.e., high Variance -𝜎!), the average revenue 
generated almost not affected by K. Therefore, the seller can set the value of K in order to 
facilitate harvest operations coordination with other harvest sites. On the other hand, the lower 
the flexibility of the bidders (i.e., low Variance 𝜎!), the bigger is the impact of K on the revenue. 
It also has an impact of revenue variability which increases as bidders flexibility increase. 
Consequently, there is an element of risk associated with lower bidder flexibility that requires a 
special attention from the seller. In other words, the seller must adapt the structure of the auction 
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As a consequence, the profitability of this time-based combinatorial auction is mainly a function 
of (1) forest stand size and how bidders value larger forest stands; (2) bidders' time preference; 
and (3) the level of flexibility required by the seller to deliver all products to their winners. 
Because this latter can be changed by the seller/auctioneer in order to adjust to bidders' time 
preference, as well as the harvest season, which affects timber deterioration, the time-based 
combinatorial auction is generally relevant for the auctioneer.  
5.8 Conclusion: 
This paper proposes a sustainable time-based timber combinatorial auction, which aims to 
simultaneously allocate multiple products in mixed forest stand to multiple winners, and address 
the coordination of timber deliveries to their winners. The proposed timber combinatorial auction 
is economically sustainable. First, all products are sold individually and allocated according to 
their economic value, with respect to each potential user’s market. In other words, a small timber 
user in a high value market has more control over procurement operations and timber availability 
if needed. On the contrary to a pure licensed system, in which procurement volumes cannot be 
easily adjusted, a combinatorial timber auction give a fair chance to participate to every potential 
timber user. In a combinatorial auction, and for the same reasons, it is more difficult for large 
forest product companies to gain complete control over timber availability. Finally, because the 
seller becomes responsible for managing forest operations, the combinatorial auction allows the 
Ministry of natural resources to exercise high standards for environmentally friendly forest 
operations as well. 
From a logistic point of view, in contrast to other time-based auction systems, time is not part of 
the product for sale. It is only used as variable of the valuation of the products for sale. 
Consequently, although this auction system is more complicated for the bidders than the current 
first-price sealed bid auction, it has many advantages for both the auctioneer and the bidders. First, 
time-based combinatorial auction can directly address the coordination of delivery of all products 
between winners, in order to improve the level of timber freshness. When multiple products must 
be delivered to multiple winners, the coordination of harvest operations and delivery must be 
carried out. By directly addressing this issue, the time-based combinatorial auction has the 
potential to simplify complex post-auction negotiations between the winners and the seller. 
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Therefore, by carefully setting up the allowed level of flexibility required to coordinate delivery 
with both, the bidders’ expectation and the need for timber freshness, the auctioneer can reduce 
the cost of planning harvest operations and delivery. 
In order to further validate this auction model, future research projects include the 
implementation of this auction model into a multiple-round auction simulation. Such a project 
would allow us to evaluate dynamically, and with realistic cost functions, both the level of 
revenue generated for the auctioneer, but also the logistic usefulness of the auction for the bidder 
with respect to the coordination of their procurement throughout the year. In this simulation 
model, all associated costs, such as harvest cost and coordination cost can be measured. The 
behaviour of the bidders can also be simulated according to bidders’ greed and impatience.  
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CHAPTER 6 : GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This thesis consists of three journal articles dealing with simulation and design of timber auction 
systems. In this chapter, the relation between the contributions of three papers is presented and 
discussed. The conclusion of the thesis is also presented. Furthermore, the implementation 
methods of these papers in the industry are discussed.  
6.1 Multiple-round single unit timber auctions 
First, the results obtained from our first paper showed that the adaptive and learning bidding 
patterns have the best results in terms of their design objectives compare to other bidding patterns. 
Based on the comparison of price paid per m3 of all bidding approaches, the learning approach is 
better than all other approaches in almost every configuration. However, the price in the adaptive 
approach is almost equivalent to the price in the learning approach when the competition is low 
and the lots are bigger. This validates what we intended to program. Similarly, price paid seems 
to be less when items are bigger. This result is a first indicator on how to design the auction in 
order to maximize revenue from the seller point of view. The results combined with comparing 
target achievement shows learning approach bidders pay less for the item, while the adaptive 
approach bidders have a better target achievement. Therefore, according to their objective, 
bidders should use any combination of these two approaches. This is why, in the remaining 
experiments, fixed behaviour and random approaches were abandoned, as they do not try to 
achieve any particular objective. 
Second, comparing hybrid bidder agents (adaptive learning agents), the less a hybrid agent is 
influenced by the adaptive behaviour, the less sensitive to competition it is to achieving good sale 
prices. This also confirms the findings of the first experiment, which, compared to the learning 
approach, found that the adaptive approach has a stronger negative impact on the sale price, than 
it has a positive impact on target achievement. As expected, the observed performance of the 
different types of hybrid agent is generally correlated to how much of the pure behaviours they 
are made of. However, it seems that the influence of the adaptive behaviour is more significant 
than the influence of the learning behaviour, although they all display an almost equally good 
performance with respect to target achievement. Therefore we can safely assume that the 
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generation of a population of randomly generated hybrid agents is representative of a population 
of rational bidders driven by any combination of both objectives. 
The influence of several auction design parameters on the outcome of the auction (price and 
target achievement) is also tested. All results show systematic opposite effects of all design 
parameters on both outcomes. For instance, lot size affects positively target achievement and 
negatively sale price. More specifically, when item size gets larger, the sale price per m3 
decreases. Smaller lots attract more bidders, which causes more demand, which in turn increases 
the sale price.  
Similarly, periodicity has a rather limited influence on value below 15 days. However, shorter 
periodicities tend to be generally more beneficial than longer ones. This influence can be 
explained as follows. When periodicity increases, while the total number of auctions remains 
unchanged, the number of items for sale increases at each round. In other words, there are fewer 
rounds of auctions, but more auctions at each round. Consequently, the influence of periodicity 
on sale price target achievement can be explained by the fact that bidders can achieve lesser price 
if they can bid simultaneously on more items (i.e., more supply quantities per round). 
Along the same line, the number of auctions affects positively target achievement, and negatively 
sale price. As the number of auctions decreases, the influence of lot size and the influence of the 
number of bidders on sale price are reduced as well. This can be explained by the fact that 
reduced supply leads to a higher number of interested bidders, even if the items' lot size is large 
or the number of potential bidders is low. This result shows that higher competition with respect 
to a certain level of supply, leads to a market price that better represents the limit of forest 
companies to purchase items. 
In contrast, the number of bidders has a positive impact on sale price, but a negative impact on 
target achievement. This result can be explained as follow. As competition and demand increase, 
the number of bids received during each auction increase, which results in a higher probability of 
receiving high value bids. Along the same line, increased competition also reduces the probability 
of each forest company to win, and therefore reduces their ability to achieving their target.  
Finally, the correlation between target achievement and sale price is negative, which tends to 
show that both objectives cannot be achieved simultaneously. In other words, it seems that the 
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government that owns the forest has a dilemma as it can either maximize its revenue, or support 
the industry by allowing companies to better achieve their supply target. Using the presented 
simulation model, the government can optimize its revenue while considering the target 
achievement of the companies.  
The presented model in the first paper does not allow the bidders to bid on a part of the lot. 
Indeed, some mills or entrepreneurs do not need entire lots, but only some of their products. 
Therefore combinatorial auction can be investigated which allows the bidders to bid on any 
subset of the lot.  
6.2 Multiple-round combinatorial timber auctions 
Analysing the effects of each parameter shows that when the number of auction increases, the 
price per m3 decreases due to more supply in the market. The price per m3 drops when the lots get 
larger, again because of more supply. By demand increase (number of bidders), the price per m3 
increases as well. The results show when the number of auctions increases, the price per m3 
increases, even if lot size changes, but the price is lower when lot size gets larger. The reason for 
this result is that both number of auctions and lot size are significantly increase the supply of the 
market. Therefore, the combination of these two parameters affects the price per m3 of the market. 
Therefore, price per m3 is higher in combinatorial auction when there are fewer supplies and 
more bidders.  
Along the same line, the auctions comparison illustrates that the combinatorial auction is 
preferable in competitive situations. Combinatorial auction is better when there are fewer 
auctions while the lots are small and there are few bidders. The auctioneer can sell the products 
with higher price through combinatorial auction, when the market is competitive (more demand 
and less supply). 
From the bidders point of view, number of auctions and lot size carry positive impact, while 
periodicity and number of bidders have negative impact on the target achievement. The reasons 
for positive impact is more supplies through auction system, therefore, the bidders can win more 
wood supply to fulfill their needs. Similarly, when number of bidders rises, the auction becomes 
more competitive and the chance of winning drops. When periodicity is higher, the bidders meet 
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more auctions to bid on at same round. Therefore, they have more options (auctions) to decide. 
The bidders tend to bid only on the amount they need, since they think they may win; hence, they 
might lose some opportunities by not participating in other auctions. Therefore, it is probable that 
bidders win lower volumes when there are more auctions at one round. The bidders prefer 
combinatorial auction, when the market is competitive. On the other hand, the target achievement 
of combinatorial auction is higher than target achievement of combinatorial auction in 
competitive auction market. The combinatorial auction is much better than single-unit in 
situations when there are few auctions, few rounds of auction (higher periodicity), and more 
bidders. 
Although combinatorial auction has some advantages over single-unit auction, it may be difficult 
for the bidders to arrange for the harvest operations and products delivery, since the winners are 
chosen only according to what products they want, not when they want the products. The bidders 
may also not agree on the harvest operation, which induces the low wood quality due to the time 
difference between the harvesting and processing the wood in the mill. To address this issue, this 
paper proposes time-based combinatorial auction as a follow up research project. Time-based 
combinatorial auction aims to allocate multiple products to multiple winners, while consider the 
coordination of timber deliveries to the winners. 
6.3 Time-based combinatorial timber auctions 
First, the time-based combinatorial auction leads systematically to a slight loss of revenue, due to 
the decreasing valuation function used to calculate the offer’s value as it moves away from the 
preferred harvest period. This loss of revenue represents the maximum value that the seller 
invests in the coordination of harvest and delivery operations after the auction, in conjunction 
with the winners. In other words, if the value of this loss of revenue is higher than the cost of 
managing the coordination of deliveries, then the simple combinatorial auction with no time 
management is better for the seller. This cost can vary greatly according the number of winners 
and their willingness to find a compromise. 
Second, it shows when bidders' flexibility is low (i.e., high drop of value when moving away 
from the preferred period), then the loss of revenue increases to 3% on average. On the contrary, 
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when bidders have no time preference, then the time-based combinatorial auction is equivalent to 
the combinatorial auction with no time management. 
Finally, the results of the revenue generated from time-based combinatorial auction show that 
when the bidders have more flexibility, the average revenue generated almost not affected by K 
(is the length of the delivery horizon). Therefore, the seller can set the value of K in order to 
facilitate harvest operations coordination with other harvest sites. On the other hand, the lower 
the flexibility of the bidders, the bigger is the impact of K on the revenue. It also has an impact of 
revenue variability which increases as bidders flexibility increase. Consequently, there is an 
element of risk associated with lower bidder flexibility that requires a special attention from the 
seller.  
As a consequence, the profitability of the time-based combinatorial auction is mainly a function 
of the bidders' time preference and the level of flexibility required by the seller to deliver all 
products to their winners.  
6.4 Industrial impact of scientific contributions 
The simulation model and the analysis provided in the first part of this project could help the 
Ministry of Forests, Wildlife and Parks (MFFP) to configure the proposed auction system. Also, 
the combinatorial auction is capable of analyzing advanced form of wood auction including 
allocating wood in mixed forest. As the Quebec government and timber users may face some 
difficulties in combinatorial auction, a new method of auction (time-based combinatorial auction) 
is proposed to the government. 
This thesis proposes many contributions to the multiple-round single-unit timber auction for the 
government and forest companies, which had not yet been studied before. There are contributions 
for both sellers and buyers.  
• The bidders learn how to bid in existing auction system using adaptive and agent-learning 
methods.  
• The approach presents a mathematical linear programing model to bidders to select the 
best set of items to bid on at each round of auction. 
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• The government (seller) can maximize its revenue using the outcome of the research, 
which studies parameter configuration of the auction. 
This thesis also provides other solutions to the government by proposing a design and simulation 
of “multiple-round timber combinatorial auction”. It provides contributions for the seller as 
follows.  
• The study presents the market conditions and auction parameters in which the auction can 
generate more revenue for the government.  
• It can guide the government whether combinatorial auction can generate more revenue for 
the government comparing to single unit auction in any specific market situation. The 
market conditions for which combinatorial auctions can outperform compared to single-
unit auction are presented. 
  
This thesis also proposes “time-based timber combinatorial auction” which is a solution to 
overcome coordination of forest activities among winners. The “time-based timber combinatorial 
auction” model brings the following contributions for the seller.  
•  This auction model includes time, which is used to valuate the good for sale with respect 
to expected delivery period in combinatorial auction. This system allocates multiple 
goods in mixed forest stand, to multiple winners, and to address the coordination of 
timber deliveries to winners while considering the freshness of wood. 
• The winner determination problem of time-base combinatorial auction is presented for 
the auctioneers who want to use this auction in their model.  
• The model contributes on delivery coordination while it may impact total revenue due to 
loss of value when time preference is not fully satisfied.  
The Quebec government is interested in this research project, as their current system needs to be 
evaluated in different setup configurations and different market conditions. The results of this 
thesis can also help the bidders, which are mills and entrepreneurs, in order to determine how to 
bid using intelligent methods. The second results of this project conduct combinatorial auction, 
which is opened to bidders who are interested in a portion of a lot. Although the combinatorial 
auction has some advantages that increases bidders’ interests to participate, it needs collaboration 
among winners in a lot. Therefore we propose and analyze time-base combinatorial auction to the 
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government as an alternative. This model can be investigated to be implemented when the 
government is not willing to deal with collaboration of the winners while consider wood 
freshness. 
6.5 Conclusion  
In the first contribution, the multiple-round single-unit timber auction is simulated. The results 
indicate that the adaptive and learning bidding patterns have better results compared to the other 
approaches. These patterns can be applied in designing a company's bidding pattern. Then, the 
results show that the government cannot simultaneously achieve high revenue while providing an 
effective supply channel to forest companies. This fact is considered in the design of the auction 
process to find out an arrangement in order to generate acceptable revenue while keeping forest 
companies' activities. Further, the results also indicate that the number of potential bidder and 
number of auctions per year significantly impacts the revenue generated. Finally, paper one 
demonstrates that by offering larger forest lots leads to higher target achievement of companies, 
and lower average sales price.  
In the second paper, multiple-round combinatorial auctions was designed and simulated. The 
results indicate that in multi-round auctions with longer time horizon (more rounds) 
combinatorial auctions perform better than single-unit auctions in sale price and target 
achievement. Next, our results demonstrate that when the market is more competitive, the selling 
price per m3 is higher in combinatorial auction. Then, the results of the auctions comparisons 
illustrate that the combinatorial auction should be favored by government in competitive 
situations. On the other hand, the target achievement of the companies in combinatorial auction is 
higher in less competitive market.  
Finally, in the third paper a time-base combinatorial timber auction is proposed. This paper 
describes how this model is economically sustainable. It describes how all types of products can 
be sold separately while allocated according to their economic value, while considering each type 
of timber users, and delivered to users at the time that they need the products. Hence, this auction 
system has many advantages for both the auctioneer and the bidders, despite of the difficulty of 
the auction compared to the current first-price sealed bid auction. To increase the level of timber 
freshness, time-based combinatorial auction directly considers the coordination of harvest 
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operations and delivery of multiple products between multiple winners. Ability to coordinate 
while assigning the products, can simplify complex post-auction negotiations between the 
winners and the seller. Therefore, when the allowed level of flexibility required, it is carefully 
choose to coordinate delivery with the bidders’ expectation, the auctioneer can reduce the cost of 
planning harvest operations and delivery. 
6.6 Future work 
Future work can be done in several directions as following. The agent-based simulation of the 
time-based combinatorial auction that was presented in the third paper could be implemented. 
Similar studies can be done in order to compare the outcomes of time-based combinatorial 
auction and regular combinatorial auction. Next, in this simulation model, all associated costs; 
such as harvest cost and coordination cost can be measured. Following, the time-based 
combinatorial auction can be applied and tested in similar other markets such as allocation of 
scarce natural resources.  
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